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Article 3

Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency
Nelson Lund
I am not afraid to say that the doctrine of self-interestproperly
understood appears to me the best suited of all philosophical
theories to the wants of men in our time and that I see it as
their strongest remaining guarantee against themselves.
Contemporary moralists therefore should give most of their
attention to it. Though they may well think it incomplete, they
must nonetheless adopt it as necessary.'

President Clinton's first White House Counsel: Bernard
Nussbaum, was pressured into resigning his post after a
special prosecutor began looking into meetings he had held
with officials of an independent regulatory agency. These
meetings, which dealt with the agency's investigations of
fmancial dealings in which the President and his wife had been
involved before they came to Washington, were immediately
and almost universally denounced. Clearly bitter at having lost
his job because of a standard of conduct having more t o do with
appearances of impropriety than with legal rules, Nussbaum
claimed that he was the victim of people "who do not

* Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.
Ph.D., Harvard University 1981; J.D., University of Chicago 1985.
While serving at the White House as associate counsel to the president from
1989 to 1992, I participated in many of the matters discussed here; all facts
directly relied on for this analysis are matters of public record or common
knowledge. For helpful comments on an earlier draft, I am grateful to Neal Devins,
Harvey Flaumenhaft, Stephen G. Gilles, Mara S. Lund, John 0. McGinnis, Geoffrey
P. Miller, Stephen G. Rademaker, and Nicholas P. Wise. Generous financial
support was provided by the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the John M. Olin
Foundation, and William Loeffler offered able research assistance. The author
retains responsibility for errors.
DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA572 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVZUE,
1969).
2. Throughout this article, I will use 'White House counsel" interchangeably
with the more formal term "counsel to the president."
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understand, nor wish to understand the role and obligations of
a lawyer, even one acting as White House Co~nsel."~
Nussbaum seems to have believed that the job of a
lawyer-any lawyer-is to act as aggressively as possible t o
protect the interests of the individual who retains him, so long
as his actions are "consistent with the rules of law, standards
of ethics, and the highest traditions of the Bar.'" Nussbaum's
view was soon attacked by his predecessor from the Bush
administration, C. Boyden Gray, who said: "He confused his
fiduciary role as a temporary occupant of that office with the
no-holds-barred role a private litigant would have. He is not
[the Clintons'] private lawyer. He is the lawyer for the Oval
Office." Nussbaum's successor, Lloyd Cutler, also rejected the
applicability of the private-lawyer model. When the President
announced his appointment, Cutler said:
The Counsel is supposed to be counsel for the President in
office and for the Office of the Presidency, as many people
have said. Most of the time, those two standards coincide.
Almost always the advice you would give the President is
advice that is in the interest of the Office of the
Presidency. . . . When it comes to a President's private affairs,
particularly private affairs that occurred before he took office,
those should be handled by his own personal private counsel
and, in my view, not by the White House C ~ u n s e l . ~

As this is written,' the Clintons and Nussbaum have
steadily maintained that they committed no illegal or unethical
acts. Although this article is not concerned with the events
surrounding Nussbaum's resignation, those events provide a
striking illustration of the somewhat uneasy professional and
institutional relationships between presidents and their closest
legal advisors. Whatever may come to light in the continuing
investigations of the Clinton administration, we can be sure
that this will not be the last eruption of controversy about the
proper relationship between presidents and their legal advisors

N.Y.

3. See The Whitewater Inquiry: Text of Resignation Letter and Clinton Reply,
TIMES, March 6, 1994, !j 1, at 23, col. 1.

4. Id.
5. Naftali Bendavid, Whitewater Meets the Washington Legal Culture, LEGAL
TIMES, March 14, 1994, at 1, 14 (quoting C. Boyden Gray).
6. Remarks Announcing the Appointment of Lloyd Cutler as Special Counsel
to the President and an Exchange With Reporters, 30 WKLY.COMP. PRES.DOC.
462, 465 (March 8, 1994).
7. November 1994.
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in the government. Ever since Watergate made the distinctions
among the president's various personal and official interests i n
his office a subject of close public scrutiny, the history of that
office has looked as much like a battle among lawyers as it has
a contest between presidents and their political opponents.
One legacy of Watergate has been an intense interest,
often politically motivated, i n the ethics of those who serve i n
the upper reaches of government, along with a proliferation of
new laws ostensibly aimed at curbing unethical conduct by
government official^.^ And one consequence of that legacy has
been a growth in the size of the office of the White House
Counsel, which plays a preeminent role in seeking to prevent
ethical embarrassments from impeding the president's
substantive agenda.g Mr. Nussbaum's government career
foundered on the treacherous ethical rocks that have been
thrown around the shores of the presidency, a fate that has
become almost commonplace among senior officials during the
last two decades.''
The preoccupation with ethics in government is the most
obvious lingering effect of the Watergate affairs, but it may not
be the most important. This article will consider a less visible
aftermath of Watergate: the increasing si@icance of disputes
that generally fall under the rubric of separation of powers.
President Nixan, of course, tried unsuccessfully to invoke the

8. The most important of these laws is the Ethics in Government A d of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 2, 5, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). Other major examples include: Government in the
Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C. app., and 39 U.S.C.); Presidential Records Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified at 44 U.S.C. $8 2201-2207);
Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 3, 5, 18, 28, & 31 U.S.C.).
9. For an insightful summary of the history of this aspect of the White
House Counsel's office, see Jeremy Rabkin, At the President's Sde: The Role of the
White House Counsel in Constitutional Policy, LAW & CONTEMP.PRoBs., Autumn
1993, at 63, 72-76. The many functions performed by the Office of the Counsel to
the President in recent years are described briefly in BRADLEYH. PATTERSON,JR.,
THE RING OF POWER141-50 (1988).
10. The course that led Nussbaum to the White House Counsel's office began
when he worked as a staff lawyer for the House Judiciary Committee as it was
considering the impeachment of President Nixon, where he worked with a young
staf'f aide named Hillary Rodham. Stephen Labaton, New Role for White House
Counsel: De Facto Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES,March 9, 1993, at A14, col. 1.
Further research would be needed in order to determine whether the connection
between Nussbaum's two ventures into national politics constitute an odd
coincidence, or an example of poetic justice.

20

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995

constitutional separation of powers to prevent his own
downfall. As emboldened congresses and a more belligerent
press have sought to subject subsequent presidents to tighter
and tighter controls, those presidents have also invoked the
Constitution to protect themselves from encroachments on their
freedom of action. Some of these disputes have arisen from the
post-Watergate ethics laws," but they have not by any means
been limited to this context. Because recent turf fights between
presidents and their adversaries have often been waged in legal
and constitutional terms, lawyers who specialize in the
separation of powers have become much more prominent than
they once were. The function of articulating a principled
defense of presidents and the presidency-mostly
from
congressional incursions-is carried out primarily by those who
serve in the Office of the Counsel to the President a t the White
House and in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel
("OLC"), to which the Attorney General's legal advisory
function has largely been delegated.12 The rise of this species
of presidential lawyer is worthy of considerable attention, both
for its intrinsic intellectual interest and because it can be
expected to have continuing effects on the political life of our
nation. l3
The comments that Gray and Cutler offered when
Nussbaum resigned his office1* exemplify the conventional
wisdom among this new breed of presidential lawyer about the
proper relationship between them and their client. Cutler and
Gray agree that government lawyers may not properly serve as
the president's personal attorney, and in this they are surely
correct. But they also agree that the office of the presidency
should, at least to some extent or in some circumstances, be
11. E-g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U:S. 654 (1988) (constitutional challenge to
the Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978).
12. OLC is a small office, headed by an Assistant Attorney General, which is
usually staffed by twenty-odd lawyers. The office a d s as general counsel for the
Department of Justice and as outside counsel for the White House and for the
executive departments and agencies.
13. As Professor Geoffrey P. Miller has pointed out, legal bureaucracies that
deal with separation of powers issues have grown up in both the executive and
legislative departments of government, so that disputes that might once have been
resolved through political accommodation are now more likely to be c h a ~ e l e dinto
the courts. See Geoffrey P. Miller, From Compromise to Confintation: Separation
L. REV. 401 (1989). If this trend
of Powers in the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH.
continues, the law of the separation of powers should become more complex and
more practically sigdicant .
14. Supra text surrounding notes 5 and 6.
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regarded as the real client to whom the president's lawyers owe
their professional loyalty. I believe this is incorrect in several
respects. First, it has no basis in the law. Second, it
exaggerates the professional obligations and constitutional role
of the lawyers, while suggesting an unduly restricted view of
the president's own role and obligations. Third, the moralistic
romanticism of the Gray and Cutler vision obscures the
economy of incentives that actually determines much of what
presidents and their lawyers actually do.
This article seeks to present a more realistic
understanding of the work that is and can be done by those
who advise the president about his constitutional rights and
responsibilities. I argue that the role of lawyers in defending
the presidency is determined primarily by the operation of
ordinary incentive structures, rather than by legal
requirements or professional norms. The potential influence of
these lawyers, moreover, is sharply constrained by those same
incentive structures, and especially by the fact that the
president faces different incentives than his legal advisors. I
conclude that as a result of these constraints, the principled
defense of the office of the presidency cannot become a
significant element of any president's agenda, even if the
president wants it to be. For the reasons suggested by
Tocq~eville,'~
this analysis is not the enemy of professional
obligation or constitutional responsibility, but their friend. The
doctrine of self-interest properly understood may be incomplete,
but it is the strongest guarantee against our lawyers and our
presidents.
Part I1 explains the analytical framework used in this
article, and contrasts it with other approaches that dominate
the existing academic literature. The following sections of the
article provide a detailed case study to support the conclusions
suggested by the analysis used here. Part I11 explores the Bush
administration's unprecedented effort t o implement a serious
and systematic legal strategy for the defense of the presidency.
This strategy unquestionably had visible results, but it also
generated compromises that were often more important, though
much less conspicuous. Part IV examines three major incidents
in which the administration's legal strategy was simply
abandoned. I argue that these incidents were, on the whole,

15. See supra note 1.
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more significant than the cases in which the strategy was
actually pursued. Part V analyzes the Bush administration's
single most aggressive attempt to carry out its program, and
explains how and why it completely missed its goal, leading
instead to a setback for the program. Part VI offers some
concluding observations.

11. FRAMEWORK
FOR THE ANALYSIS
The increased legalization of ethics and the increased
legalization of turf battles between the legislature and the
executive have a common origin in Watergate, but they have
also had a common effect: enhancing the influence of lawyers in
the White House and in OLC. To see why this has occurred,
consider for a moment the roles played by most of the senior
political appointees in the executive departments and agencies,
such as cabinet secretaries. In theory, these are supposed t o be
the president's representatives in the permanent bureaucracy,
giving policy direction in the light of an agenda set by the
single popularly elected possessor of the executive power of the
United States? In practice, these officials inevitably serve
both as the president's representatives in the agencies and as
representatives to the White House for the bureaucracies and
their congressional and interest-group overseers. These
conflicting roles can be balanced in different ways, and with
greater or lesser success, depending on a great variety of
circumstances. What is important for present purposes is
simply to note that the remedies for failing t o balance these
roles successfully are entirely political. Political appointees can
be fired by the president, and can be subjected t o various lesser
kinds of pressure and embarrassment from the White House.
Similarly, an agency's congressional superintendents can often
exert a considerable countervailing influence on its political
managers because of legislators' discretion to grant and
withhold appropriations, provide desirable enabling legislation,
inflict unflattering publicity through hearings and
investigations, and take other steps that will cause political
appointees to appear as successes or failures.

16. For obvious reasons, I am not referring in the present context to the socalled "independent agencies," which have been statutorily insulated from the
president's control through restrictions on his removal power.
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The president's principal legal advisors have a n apparently
very different set of roles. Unlike the various interests that
political managers are expected to balance politically, the law
binds everyone, including the president. As oracles of the law,
therefore, attorneys can in effect issue commands to their
nominal superiors in a way that others cannot. As ethics laws
have become increasingly complex and arcane, those who are
expert in their interpretation have naturally become more
important and more powerful. And, as disputes over the
allocation of power between the executive and the legislature
have become more legalistic, experts in this branch of
constitutional law have also become more important and more
powerful. The most important authorities on ethics and
separation of powers, moreover, are largely found in the same
small group of people who work a t the White House Counsel's
Office and in 0LC.17
17. Within the White House, the Counsel's office handles both ethics and
separation of powers issues. OLC is well known for its role in separation of powers
issues, and somewhat less well known for its role on ethics issues. The government
is permeated with "designated agency ethics officers" (often an agency's general
counsel), who provide day-to-day ethics advice. There is also a specialized Office of
Government Ethics that serves primarily as a source of technical knowledge and
advice about ethics issues. OLC, however, routinely makes final decisions about
particularly important or sensitive issues involving the interpretation of the ethics
statutes, just as it does with respect to other laws. For samples of important
ethics rulings by OLC, see Application of Conflict of Interest Rules to Members of
Advisory Committees, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 87 (1990) (preliminary print);
Application of Federal Bribery Statute to Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the
Army, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 244 (1989) (preliminary print); Applicability of 18
U.S.C. 8 211 to Department Monetary Awards, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 332
(1989) (preliminary print); Ethical Considerations Regarding Charitable or Political
Activities of Department Spouses, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 422 (1989)
(preliminary print); Whether the One Year Bar Prohibiting Certain Former
Government Employees from Contacting Their Former Agency Contained in 18
U.S.C. 8 207(c) Applies to Former Government Employees Who are Working for the
President-elect's Transition Team, 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 339 (1988); Waiver of
the Application of Conflict of Interest Laws for Members of the President's
Commission on Strategic Forces, 7 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 10 (1983); Restrictions
on a Federal Appointee's Continued Employment by a Private Law Firm, 7 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 123 (1983); Review of Agency Schedule C Appointments by the
Executive Office of the President, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 114 (1982); Attribution
of Outside Earned Income Under the Ethics in Government Act, 6 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 124 (1982); Payment of Expenses Associated with Travel by the President
and Vice President, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 214 (1982); Acceptance of Legal Fees
by United States Attorney, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 602 (1982); Procedures for
Investigating Allegations Concerning Senior Administration Officials, 6 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 626 (1982); Payment of Legal Fees in Connection with a Cabinet
Member's C o b a t i o n Hearings, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 126 (1981);
Computation of 90-Day Period for Preliminary Investigation Under the Special
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If lawyers were, or could be, simply the voice of the law, it
might be appropriate to treat them very differently from other
political officials in the government. But politically appointed
lawyers obviously have interests and obligations that are quite
similar to those of political managers, such as protecting and
advancing their own reputations and promoting the president's
agenda. To appreciate the special role played by lawyers who
specialize in the separation of powers, one must begin by
understanding more precisely how they differ from other
political appointees, and how they are the same.

A. Legal Ethics and the Role of the President's Legal Adu isors
Among the more salient features of most commentaries on
the advisory function of the presidential lawyer is the exaggeration of the deep and inherent tensions that are supposed to
exist between the political and professional obligations of those
responsible for providing the president with legal advice. Real
tensions between these obligations undoubtedly do exist, but
the dilemmas that result are typically specious. Lawyers who
work for the president without f d y sharing his political goals,
for example, have a n obvious incentive to wrap their own political agenda in the guise of professional obligations. Similarly,
those who wish to influence a n administration's conduct have
an obvious incentive to encourage the president's lawyers to
Prosecutor Act, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 397 (1981); Constitutionality of the
Disclosure Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act as Applied to Officials'
Spouses, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 340 (1980); Applicability of Criminal Statutes
and 'Whistleblower" Legislation to Unauthorized Employee Disclosures, 4B Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 383 (1980); Application of Conflict of Interest Rules to the Conduct
of Government Litigation by Private Attorneys, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 434
(1980); Supersession by the Ethics in Government Act of Other Financial
Disclosure Requirements, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 566 (1980); Severance
Agreement Between a Prospective Federal Appointee and His Law Firm, 4B Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 605 (1980); The President-Interpretation of 18 U.S.C. $ 603 as
Applicable to Activities in the White House, 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 31 (1979);
Ethics in Government Ad-Financial ReportApplication to Spouses and Children
of Reporting Official (5 U.S.C.A. App I), 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 280 (1979);
Conflict of I n t e r e s t 1 8 U.S.C. $ 207-Applicability
to the General Accounting
Office, 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 433 (1979); Conflicts of Interest (18 U.S.C.
$ 207&American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, 2 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 162 (1978); The White House Office-Expenditure of Appropriated
Funds-Handling Mail for Members of the President's Family, 2 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 343 (1977); The White House-The Vice PresidentGifts (3 U.S.C. $8 110,
111; 16 U.S.C. $ 6a), 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 349 (1977); Conflict of
InterestStatus of an Informal Presidential Advisor as a "Special Government
Employee," 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 20 (1977).
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resist his agenda in the name of supposedly professional considerations. Exaggeration of the tension in the role of presidential legal advisor has had real effects on the public discourse
about the role of lawyers in government, and on the academic
literature about the functioning of legal bureau~racies.'~
The principal alternative views about the professional
obligations of the president's legal advisors are illustrated by
the quotations in Part I from the three lawyers who have recently served as White House Counsel. Gray and Cutler are
clearly right in one respect. Those who serve in this position
are government employees, who cannot properly act as personal counsel for their supervisors. In this respect, however, they
are no different from lawyers retained or employed by institutional clients in the private sector. There are circumstances in
which the distinction between the interests of a corporation
and the personal interests of its principal officers is genuinely
difficult to draw. And counsel t o a private corporation will
sometimes be tempted to substitute loyalty to an officer who
controls the disposition of the firm's legal work for loyalty to
the firm. Painfbl ethical dilemmas can arise and mistaken
choices may be made by lawyers in these circumstances just as
they may in the government. Such problems are inherent in
the business of representing institutional clients, however, and
the underlying standard of conduct is the same in the public
and private sectors: "A lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its
Thus, if Nussbaum undertook
duly authorized con~tituents."'~

18. Perhaps the most spectacular recent example of the distortions that can
CAPLAN,
THE TENTHJUSTICE
result is Lincoln Caplan's The Tenth Justice. LINCOLN
(1987). This extended attack on President Reagan's second Solicitor General, who is
supposed to have compromised the "rule of law" by accommodating the President's
policy goals in briefs to the Supreme Court, is based largely on information and
accusations provided by anonymous career government lawyers possessed by an
extraordinarily expansive view of the rights conferred on them by their professional
status. These accusations, many of which are accepted by Caplan, were manifestly
motivated by disagreements with Reagan administration policy, rather than by
allegiance to actual standards of professionalism. For discussions of the biases and
conceptual mistakes in Caplan's book, see Roger Clegg, The Thirty-Fifth Law Clerk,
1987 DURE LJ. 964; James Michael Strine, The Office of Legal Counsel: Legal
Professionals in a Political System 8-14 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Johns Hopkins University).
19. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONALCONDUCTRule 1.13(a) (1992). The
rule recognizes that, in order to fullill his obligations to the organization, a lawyer
may sometimes have to refer a matter to the highest authority that can a d on
behalf of the organization. Where the highest authority insists upon proceeding in
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to represent the President or his wife (or both) in their personal capacities while he was on the public payroll, he was acting
improperly. This judgment does not depend on any peculiar
ethical tensions created by government service i n general or by
the special demands of employment in the White House.20The
same impropriety would exist if Nussbaum, after returning to
private practice, were to bill a corporate client for services
performed in behalf of the personal interests of the client's
chief executive officer.21
If it is clear that government employees may not properly
represent the personal interests of those who hire them, it is
not nearly so clear exactly what interests they are supposed to
represent. Gray and Cutler differ on this question, and their
views represent the two alternatives most frequently presented.
According to Cutler, the White House Counsel must seek to
balance the interests of the president as a politician against the
interests of the office he holds. When these interests diverge, as
they occasionally must, Cutler suggests that the lawyer must
decide which is more important in the case a t hand. Good judgment-a sensitivity to the competing demands of politics and

a manner "that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization, the lawyer may resign." Id. Rule 1.13(c). The ABA's
comment on Rule 1.13 indicates that government lawyers may operate under additional constraints imposed by statute and regulation and that "a different balance
may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the
wrongful official act is prevented or rectified, for public business is involved." Id.
Rule 1.13 cmt. (1992). This vague and unexceptionable remark is consistent with
my contention that the basic standard of ethics is the same in the public and
private sectors. For more detailed discussions of the professional obligations of
government lawyers, see Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and
the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S.
CAL.L. REV.951 (1991) (civil litigation attorneys in Department of Justice); Nelson
Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZOL. REV. 437,
447-52 (1993) (Attorney General); Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawlyers' Ethics in
a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987) (agency lawyers).
20. There are, of course, special circumstances in which an organization may
serve its own interests by paying a lawyer to represent the personal interests of
an individual. Some employers, for example, may agree to provide their employees
with certain kinds of personal legal services as part of their compensation package,
in much the same way that they cover certain medical services. Such arrangements, in which an individual is clearly and properly treated as the lawyer's client,
are not analogous to cases in which an organization's lawyer substitutes the interests of an influential individual for those of the client-organization.
21. Other questions, which I am not addressing here, are raised by a separate aspect of the incidents that cost Nussbaum his job: White House involvement
in specifk cases, possibly involving the President or his family, that are being
handled by independent regulatory agencies.

THE DEFENSE OF THE PRESIDENCY
principle, and an ability to resolve concrete dilemmas in a way
that serves the interests of the nation as a whole---is thus considered the hallmark of excellence in a presidential legal advisor. Cutler's view is neither quirky nor indefensible. It is, for
example, essentially the view taken by Professor Nancy V.
Baker in her extended study of the history of the Attorney
General's office.22
Gray articulates what seems at first to be a sharply different and more glorified view of the White House lawyer's job:
that his client is the presidency itself, an entirely abstract
entity whose needs and interests transcend the desires and
concerns of any individual who happens to get elected to that
post. When fully elaborated, this view provides a theoretical
justification for the ascent, and in many ways the ascendance,
of government lawyers who specialize in the separation of powers. Tracing their intellectual roots to Alexander Hamilton,
whose theory of the executive gives intellectual respectability
(and even a certain air of timelessness) to their endeavors,
these lawyers present themselves as agents of the Constitution
itself and guardians of an office whose significance t o our nation far outstrips the petty political disputes that consume the
daily life of most of those around the president. Important
elements of an academic theory supporting Gray's view are presented by Terry Eastland, who contends both that the Constitution itself largely dictates how presidents should conduct themselves in office and that these constitutional duties are largely
bound up with defending the prerogatives of his office.23
What unites the views expressed by Cutler and Gray-and
in my view unites them in error-is the assumption that mere
lawyers should be deciding how the president ought to accommodate his political and policy agenda with the obligations he
has t o the office he occupies. Like clients in private practice,
the president is responsible for his own decisions, and in fact
he has the authority either t o make his own legal determinations without consulting any of his lawyers or t o proceed in the
face of contrary advice from any lawyer he does consult.24It is
22. NANCYV. BAKER,CONFLICTING
LOYALTIES:
LAWAND POLPTICS
IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
OFFICE(1992).
ENERGYIN THE EXECUTIVE
(1992).
23. TERRYEASZZAND,
24. Presidents have been quite willing to exercise this right. See, e . g , GRIFFIN
B. BELL& RONALD
J. OWROW,TAKINGCAREOF THE LAW 24-28 (1982) (discussing
President Carter's decision to ignore a Justice Department opinion objecting, on
constitutional grounds, to a proposal that public funds be used to pay the salaries
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true that the president has legal obligations that differ from
those of any private citizen, or indeed from any other government official. But they are his obligations, not those of his
lawyers or subordinate^.^^ If, for example, the president decides that his political and policy agenda is more important t o
the future of the country than defending his office from constitutionally dubious legislative restrictions, no lawyer anywhere
in the government has the authority to displace that determination. Like anyone else, his lawyers may argue that a particular judgment by the president is mistaken, and they may sometimes be right. But when lawyers assume to substitute their
own judgment for the president's-as they must if "the Oval
Office" (Gray) or the "office of the presidency" (Cutler) is their
client-they are acting without legal warrant.
Though the president's lawyers have no legal right to substitute the presidency for the president as their client, they
have the right t o negotiate with the president for the privilege
of making such a substitution. Lloyd Cutler may have done just
that, for it appeared when he was appointed that President
Clinton needed his services far more than Cutler wanted the
job.26 But even apart from such special circumstances, there

of certain persons working in church schools); Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential
Legal Opinion, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1353 (1953) (discussing President Franklin
Roosevelt's rejection of his Attorney General's suggestion that legislative vetoes are
permissible under the Constitution). Similarly, presidents feel free to overrule Justice Department legal determinations with which they disagree. See, e.g., Paul M.
Barrett, Clinton Orders Justice Agency To Withdraw Brief, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16,
1994 (reporting that Department of Justice withdrew previously fded appellate brief
in bankruptcy case, and quoting the Department as saying: "The President has
concluded that [the DOJ brief] adopted a narrower view of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act than his understanding of the meaning of the new statute."); Linda
Greenhouse, Bush Reverses U.S. Stance Against Black College Aid, N.Y.TIMES,Oct.
22, 1991, at B6 (reporting that President Bush ordered Department of Justice to
file a Supreme Court brief contradicting constitutional interpretation advocated in
preceding brief).
25. Unlike other state and federal officers, who must commit that they will
"support" the Constitution, the president is constitutionally required to take a
unique oath pledging that Y . . . will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect
and defend" the Constitution. Compare U.S. CONST.art. VI with id. art. 11, $ 1.
Although the president's oath implies that he has a special obligation to the Constitution that goes beyond the obligations of other government officials, it does not
authorize any of those officials-be they lawyers, judges, or ethics specialists-to
dictate how he should meet that obligation. The only legal method for enforcing
the president's oath is through impeachment proceedings.
26. Cutler, who had served previously as President Carter's White House
Counsel, was apparently unwilling to give President Clinton at least one commitment that the President wanted. During the press conference at which the Pres-
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are persistent forces encouraging presidents to allow their
closest legal advisors to view themselves as counsel for the
presidency. If those forces were to produce a settled expectation
that the president should be treated by his chief legal advisors
merely as a kind of caretaker for the institution of the presidency, to which they owe their true allegiance, it might not
much matter whether there is a legal basis upon which the
president's lawyers could rely in presuming t o set themselves
up as judges of his fidelity t o his constitutional oath of office.
Such an arrangement might even be thought to benefit presidents more than their lawyers, since it is after all the president
who gets to employ the authority that the lawyers would be
dedicated to defending and expanding.
The Bush administration provides a useful case study
through which to explore the tensions between advising a president and advising the presidency. When George Bush was
elected president, a variety of factors had established a pattern
of conflicts in which unsettled constitutional issues involving
the separation of powers provided the terms of debate for a
struggle over control of the basic mechanisms of governance. In
addition to the continuing repercussions of the Watergate scandals and the 1974 elections, these factors included both the
seemingly fixed disinclination of the voters to establish either
political party in command of both the legislative and executive
departments of government and the fresh tensions generated
by the Iran-Contra affair. Coming into office without a wellarticulated substantive agenda, but with a strong sense of the
disorder that can arise from congressional attempts to exercise
naturally executive functions, President Bush took what must
be the unique or very unusual step of directing that a legal
strategy be developed for enhancing the defense of his office.
The record of this effort t o close the gap between constitutional
principle and administration policy can help illuminate both
the possibilities open to presidential legal advisors and the
limits on their role in government.

ident a ~ o u n c e dhis appointment, Cutler said: "I am a senior citizen, you can see,
and from direct experience, I know the intensity and the rigors of this job. And I
have, therefore, limited my commitment with the President's permission-I had to
negotiate hard for it-to a period of months." Remarks Announcing the Appointment of Lloyd Cutler as Special Counsel to the President and an Exchange With
Reporters, 30 WRLY.COMP.PRES.DOC.462 (March 8, 1994).
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B. The Existing Literature and an Alternative Approach
A close study of the Bush administration's record on separation of powers issues also offers a n opportunity to supplement a growing body of scholarship dealing with the behavior
of legal bureaucracies. This scholarship, which has been produced mainly by political scientists, attempts to explain the
behavior of lawyers in government in terms of a variety of
personal, institutional, and historical forces. Professor Nancy V.
Baker, for example, focuses on individual Attorneys General
and seeks to explain their performance in office according to
whether they behaved more as a neutral law officer or as the
president's advocate and supporter.27Professor James Michael
Strine's detailed study of OLC concludes that both continuity
and change within that office can be explained by its institutional structures, norms, roles, and rules." Professor Cornell
W. Clayton emphasizes the impact on legal policy-making at
the Justice Department of wider historical and political forces
such as the nationalization of governmental power, the
judicialization of large areas of public policy, and the institutionalization of partisan conflict.2s
The information included in these studies can explain a
great deal, for government lawyers operate in environments
that are severely constrained by a variety of factors including
the norms and expectations of the legal profession, the balance
of power that obtains among various political factions in and
out of government a t any given time, and the sheer growth i n
the size and complexity of the federal administrative state. I n
my view, however, the existing literature does not adequately
explain the operation of these factors because it gives insufficient attention to the way in which incentive structures affect
the choices made by individual lawyers and those with whom
they deal.
The absence of serious inquiry into the incentives that
affect individual choice in legal bureaucracies appears to result
i n part from constraints that the subject matter places on those
who undertake these studies. First, the most accessible sources
of information about the way legal bureaucracies operate are
the memoirs of those who have served in high positions in the
27. BAKER,supra note 22.
28. Strine, supra note 18, at 1, 318.
29. CORNELLW. CLAYTON,THE POLITICS
OF JUSIICE:THE A m m GENERAL
AND THE MAKING
OF LEGALPOLICY
(1992).
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government. Such memoirs are unreliable because their authors face an extremely strong temptation to understate the
degree to which they engaged in self-serving or mistaken behavior while in office. When researchers try to supplement
such sources through interviews with more obscure officials,
their research cannot escape the underlying problem. Many
government lawyers take the confidentiality of their work seriously, and are therefore reluctant to speak in useful detail
about what they and others in the government do. Those who
do choose t o speak with researchers, especially when they
speak anonymously, cannot be assumed either t o constitute a
fair sample or to be unbiased reporters. On the contrary, it
would be safer to suppose that many who are willing to provide
information to outsiders do so because they have an axe to
grind.30
Documentary evidence in legal archives will rarely be able
to provide much assistance in correcting the problems described
above. The documents that underlie the legal advice presidents
receive are seldom available to researchers until after the decisions t o which they relate are long past, and they often never
~ ~ advice, moreover, is formulated in
become a ~ a i l a b l e .Much
meetings and discussions that are never recorded, among people who will never have a reason to offer complete, or completely candid, accounts of what was said.
These limitations can to some extent be overcome through
sufficient study of the public record, which contains a great
deal of information about what presidents and their lawyers
actually do, and about their efforts to explain publicly what
they do. Not only does the public record contain a great deal of
information, but it has the very important advantage that research based on it can be checked by anyone who wants to
verify the claims made by those who rely on it. Unfortunately,
the public record has not been thoroughly scrutinized in the
existing literature, and for very understandable reasons. Light
reading it is not, and much of it can be confusing to those who
are unfaTMiliar with the specific bodies of law out of which par-

30. For an example of a study in which this supposition was not adopted, see
CAM, supra note 18.
31. Cf., e.g., John 0.M c G i ~ i s Models
,
of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO
L.
REV. 375, 376 (1993) (reporting that OLC library fdes contain many unpublished
opinions).
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ticular legal issues arise. And yet, one cannot meaningfully
evaluate what happens when the president is given legal advice
on important issues unless one can evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of the legal arguments involved. Without such an
evaluation, one is not likely to understand the relationship
between the legal and the extra-legal components of the advice,
or the real causes of any ensuing decisions.
The Afterword to this article gives examples of the Miculties that can arise from insufficient skepticism about information from sources within legal bureaucracies and from insuffticient familiarity with the law with which these bureaucracies
deal. These difficulties can be especially serious when academic
analysts are intent on formulating lessons that they wish t o
urge on policy-makers, as most students of this subject have
been. Professor Clayton, for example, is extremely harsh in
criticizing what he considers the "politicization" of the Justice
Department under Presidents Reagan and Bush, and he concludes that serious consideration should be given to removing
that Department from the president's control.32 Professor
Jeremy Rabkin, conversely, reviews most of what little is
known about the history of the Office of the Counsel t o the
President, and concludes by attacking the Clinton administration for relying i n ~ ~ c i e n ton
l ythe institutional wisdom of the
Justice Department.33
Such recommendations, however, can hardly be distinguished from political advice unless they are grounded in adequate explanatory models. The models employed in the literature, however, are ill-defined, and the scholarship in this area
is very short on testable predictions. Indeed, one rarely sees
any analysis that gets much beyond such self-evident points as
the following: when the executive and legislative departments
are controlled by different political parties, conflicts over sepa~
conflicts between the
ration of powers i n ~ r e a s e ;increasing
executive and the legislature tend to increase the involvement
of the judiciary in issues involving the control of governmental
institution^;^^ executive officials have less success in pursuing
aggressive agendas if their private financial dealings create op-

32.
33.
34.
35.

CLAYTON,
supra note 29, at 236.
at 95-97.
supra note 29, at 7.
CLAYTON,

Rabkin, supra note 9,
Id.
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portunities for their adversaries to attack their ethicsf6 and
legal advisors who do not champion the president's agenda lose
influence with the president while those who do champion his
agenda invite attacks from the president's political adversarie~.~'
I have tried to overcome some of the limitations in the
existing literature. First, I employ a simple and fairly well
defined model of human behavior, drawn from the science of
economics, which has proven useful in explaining a wide range
of human conduct. I assume, as a hypothesis, that the
president's legal advisors and the other people with whom they
deal in their professional lives behave as rational utility maximizers in an environment characterized by limited resources.
This model implies, most importantly for present purposes,
that people cannot have as much as they want of the most
obvious things they desire-such as money, prestige, power,
and leisure-and that they will respond to changes in their
environment by changing their own behavior in an effort to
maximize their self-interest. Using this model does not require
one to assume that truly disinterested, or even self-sacrificing,
behavior never occurs. Nor need one assume that acts of insanity or irrational zealotry never occur. The approach adopted
here simply makes the provisional assumption that such conduct is rare enough in certain contexts (in this case, the business of government during the late twentieth century in the
United States) that events will largely proceed as if self-sacrificing or irrational behavior were none~istent.~'
Use of the rational-choice model seems particularly suitable in examining the behavior of people operating in a system
that was consciously designed to promote an identity (though
necessarily an imperfect one) between duty and interest.3gAn-

36. BAKER,mpra note 22, at 100.
37. Id. at 172, 175-76.
38. Thus, I emphatically do not contend or assume that human behavior
generally, or the behavior considered in this article, can be fully understood
through the application of rational-choice analysis alone. Such claims have been cogently criticized. See, e-g., Herbert J. Storing, The Science of Administration: Herbert A. Simon, in ESSAYSON THE SCIENTIFIC STUDYOF POLITICS(Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1962); cf. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?
(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON.REV.1 (1993) (applying
a rational-choice model to "ordinary" life-tenured judges but leaving open the possibility that the behavior of judicial "titans," "Prometheans," or "genius-saints" would
require a more complex analysis).
39. This theme recurs throughout the Federalist Papers, but the best known
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other reason for regarding this model as especially u s e N in
the present context is that it helps direct attention to important causal influences that those who create the public record
on which we must rely have a motive to conceal, even from
themselves. People who serve in public office are both expected
and inclined to explain their own behavior by reference to the
"public interest" or "the law" or "the Constitution," rather than
in terms of their self-interest. Abandoning this expectation and
discouraging these inclinations would not elevate public discourse or improve the operation of government. But neither can
it advance the understanding of government to accept such
protestations of disinterestedness, at least without critical
examination. Government lawyers, in particular, may be less
driven by self-interest than those who compete with other people in the worlds of business or electoral politics, but such a
happy fact is one that would need to be proved rather than
assumed.
One of the more obvious dangers in the use of a rationalchoice model, of course, is that one will be tempted simply t o
discount appeals to standards such as "the law" or "the Constitution" as so much self-serving camouflage, without giving
sufficient attention t o the fact that people can include fidelity
to the law in their own utility functions.40The law and legal
principles, like the dictates of loyalty and justice, can and do
operate as meaningful constraints on lawyers' behavior even

formulation is probably the following:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man
must be c o ~ e c t e dwith the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a
reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to
control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the
greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
dficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence
on the people is, no doubt the primary control on the government; but
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
THE FEDERALIST
NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
40. Cf. THE FEDERALISTNO. 77, at 458 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The supposition of universal venality in human nature is little
less an error in political reasoning than the supposition of universal rectitude.").
Venality, of course, is not the same as self-interest, but Hamilton's criticism of
inverse sentimentality is an apt warning to anyone who employs economic analysis
in the study of politics.
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though this surely happens less often than lawyers say it does
when they are explaining their own actions. I have tried to
avoid the pitfall of unjustified cynicism by examining the
strengths and weaknesses of the legal arguments offered by the
individuals whose conduct is being considered, and by comparing what they actually did with the explanations they offered
for what they did.
The rational-choice model of human behavior generates a
simple but somewhat counter-intuitive prediction about the
subject-matter of this article: a president should prove unsuccessful if he attempts to m k e the defense of the presidency an
important element of his administration's agenda. The rewards
for a consistent and forceful defense of the legal interests of the
office of the presidency would be largely abstract, since they
would consist primarily of fidelity to a certain theory of the
Constitution. To the extent that the rewards could be translated into actual increased power to accomplish policy and political goals, those rewards would mostly be reaped a t some remote period of time, after the defenders of the theory had left
office. The costs of pursuing a serious defense of the presidency,
however, would tend to be immediate and tangible. These costs
would include the expenditure of political capital that might
have been used for more pressing purposes, the unpleasantness
of increased friction with congressional barons and their allies,
and the sheer expenditure of time by extremely busy people on
uninvitingly dry legal issues.
Presidential lawyers who specialize in the separation of
powers would tend to collect a large share of the benefits in the
form of increased glory and increased job satisfaction, but the
specialization of functions that produces this result also means
that the costs would largely be borne by others in the government, above all by the president. Therefore, when the costs to
the president (and to those of his advisors with a broader responsibility for governance than that allocated t o separation-ofpowers lawyers) become siWcant, we should expect the
lawyers' legal principles t o be compromised or abandoned. And
because the costs of adhering t o those principles tend t o be
highest in the most important cases, we should expect t o find a
pattern in which the principles are adhered to only primarily in
relatively trivial cases. The following sections of this article are
devoted to testing these predictions.
The approach sketched here necessarily requires a level of
analysis that is more detailed than one ordinarily fmds in stud-
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ies of the operation of legal bureaucracies. I have therefore
limited the study in two dimensions. First, only issues involving the separation of powers are considered. Second, the analysis is confined almost exclusively to George Bush's four years i n

In 1987, Vice President Bush was introduced at a meeting
of a group of conservative lawyers by C. Boyden Gray, who had
served as his Counsellor throughout the Reagan administration. The Vice President then delivered a speech arguing that
congressional "micromanagement" of foreign policy was an
improper substitution of the legislature's properly political
oversight responsibilities with a n unduly legalistic "regulatory"
regime. Bush believed both that this was a serious practical
problem because it threatened to "destroy our government's
ability to function effectively," and that its amelioration required practical steps to establish relationships of trust between officials in the executive and legislative departments of
government. Significantly, however, Bush contended that these
practical steps should be taken in the context of a reexamination of the intent of the Framers of the Constitution and the
"objective principles embodied in the law" they created.42
After becoming president, one of Bush's very first public
statements dealt with this same issue: "I am concerned about
the erosion of presidential power, particularly in the fields of
national defense and foreign policy, but I want to work with
Congress," Bush said. "If they want in on the take-off, fine. I've
got to make the decision. I have constitutional responsibilities
and they have theirs, largely in the purse string^.'"^ The Pres-

41. Similarly, detailed studies may usefully be made of other issue clusters
and of other eras. One corollary of the argument presented in this article, for example, is that we should expect to find that significant expansions of presidential
power, and serious resistance to congressional efforts to restrict that power, might
sometimes occur, but almost always as a by-product of presidents' efforts to accomplish other substantive objectives. This proposition should be tested against the
historical record, but that project is beyond the scope of this article.
42. George Bush, m e Interaction of the Legislative, Judicial, and Executive
Branches in the Making of Foreign Policy, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLZY 1, 1-3
(1988).
43. Bush Pledges to Work with Congress but Warns of Firm Hand, UPI, Jan.
21, 1989. See also Robert Shogan, Bush's Dilemma in Dealing with a Contrary
Hill, L.A. T ~ sApril
, 16, 1989, pt. 5, at 3, col. 2 ("As he struggled last year for
the GOP presidential nomination, Bush bitterly complained about the 'chaos' pro-
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ident also moved quickly to establish a special team of lawyers
t o devise legal strategies for carrying out his interests in these
matters." The ranking members of this group were C. Boyden
Gray and William P. Barr, the Assistant Attorney General for
OLC, who was offen described as Gray's prot~g6.~'
Barr's reputation at OLC came to rest largely on his aggressive defense
of presidential authority;'6 and he enjoyed a meteoric rise
from almost complete obscurity to the office of Attorney General.

Defense of the constitutional authorities of the presidency
continued to receive considerable attention throughout Bush's
presidency. In a major address on the Constitution midway
through his term, for example, the President talked mainly
about relations between the president and Congress. In this
address, he claimed that he had possessed the "inherent power7'
t o use the armed forces in the Gulf War without congressional
authorization; he said that when Congress takes aggressive
legislative action against specific presidential powers, "the
President has a constitutional obligation to protect his Office
and to veto the legislation"; and he boasted of having said on
many occasions "that statutory provisions that violate the Constitution have no binding legal force.'"' At the very end of his
term, moreover, President Bush engaged in an unusually direct
and personal effort to assert authority over a federal agency

duced by congressional 'micromanagement' of foreign policy. You got 535 secretaries of state up there,' he declared. The world outside observes and loses faith.'");
Gerald F. Seib, Bush Will Attempt to Trim Powers of Congress, Particularly on
National-Security Policy Issues, WALLST. J., Feb. 1, 1989.
44. See R.W. Apple, A Balance of Bush7 The Congress and the Contras, N.Y.
TIMES,April 2, 1989, $ 4, at 1, col. 1 ("[Tlwo weeks ago [Bush] and a group of key
aides decided to create a working group to combat what they termed 'the erosion
of Presidential authority'. ").
45. Many sources treat B a d s relationship with Gray. See, e.g., Sharon
LaFraniere, Burr Takes Center Stage a t Justice Department With New Script,
WASH. POST, March 5, 1992, at A19; Phil McCombs, Counsel's Last Hurrah: The
Final Furious Days of C. Boyden Gray, WASH.
POST, Jan. 16, 1993, a t GI; Michael
Wines, A Counsel With Sway Over Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1991, at A16, col.
1.
46. See e.g., David Johnston, Washington a t Work; Political Lifeguard at the
Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1990, at B8, col. 1; Daniel Klaidman, Burr
Takes Hard Line On Executive Power; Senate Mulls AG Nominee's Record, LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1991, at 1; Sharon LaFraniere, For Nominee Barr, an Unusual
POST,Nov. 12, 1991, at A6.
Path to Attorney General's Office, WASH.
47. Remarks a t Dedication Ceremony of the Social Science Complex a t
Princeton University in Princeton, New Jersey, 27 WKLY.COW. PRES. DOC. 589,
590-91 (May 10, 1991).
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(the U.S. Postal Service) that Congress had sought t o insulate
from the president's control.48
This very high-level interest in shoring up the legal defense of the presidency distinguished the Bush administration
from its predecessor. President Reagan's first Attorney General,
in a rare criticism of the president he served, wrote in his
memoirs:
If there was one area in which the White House was deficient
during my years in office, it was in the protection of
presidential power. Decisions there were made on the basis of
the substance of individual issues. There was no effective
concern or review of the impact that issue or the position
taken with respect t o i t would have on presidential power.
Nor was there any effort to identify governmental activities
elsewhere that, if developed, would adversely affect the province of the executive. Nor, to be candid, was the bully pulpit
used t o provide leadership or defense of that vital instituti~n.~'

This is not to say that the Reagan administration ignored the
separation of powers or that it was unwilling to act in defense
of the presidency." Indeed, Reagan's constitutional lawyers-primarily those at OLC-had worked out a detailed jurisprudence that was scarcely revised or supplemented during the
Bush years.51Bush's new initiative may be viewed merely as
48. See infia part V.
49. WILLIAMFRENCH
SMITH,LAW AND JUSTICE
IN THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION 222 (1991). The Meese Justice Department was somewhat more aggressive
than its predecessor on separation-of-powers issues, and the pattern of White
House behavior described by Smith may have changed somewhat as a result of the
particularly close relationship between Reagan and Meese. What seems to set the
Bush administration apart is the personal interest that the President himself took
in the concerns that Smith identified in the passage quoted above.
50. Nor is this to say that the separation of powers and the defense of presidential prerogatives had been insignificant prior to the Reagan-Bush years. Democratic and Republican administrations alike, for example, had consistently objected
on constitutional grounds to legislative vetoes and to certain provisions of the War
Powers Resolution. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (a case in which both
the Carter and Reagan administrations challenged a legislative veto); John W.
Rolph, The Decline and Fall of the War Powers Resolution, 40 NAVAL
L. REV.85
(1992); Strine, supra note 18, at 195-206.
51. OLC began contributing heavily to the legalization of separation-of-powers
disputes at least as early as the Carter administration. Strine, supra note 18, at
195-206. During the Reagan administration, however, the importance of OLC's role
seems to have increased. Cf. Miller, supra note 13, at 410-12 (recounting the aggressive resurgence of the presidency under Reagan as compared to his predecessors).
'
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an elevation of the Reagan administration's jurisprudence t o
the status of administration policy. Or, one could say, Bush
was endorsing the concerns and goals of OLC in a way that
would allow the body of legal principles developed in that office
t o be given a fair test outside the rarefied and insular atmosphere of OLC itself. If we want some idea of what can happen
when a president allows, and even encourages, his leading lawyers t o devote themselves to the interests of the presidency
itself, the Bush administration offers an almost perfect case
study.
I have argued elsewhere that OLC faces a set of constraints and incentives that prevent it from developing an institutional mission of the kind that is often observed in government bureaucracies, including such legal bureaucracies as the
Office of the Solicitor General.52It is even more obvious that
the White House Counsel's office-which is completely reconstituted with each new administration and which each president
is free to shape in whatever way he sees fit-cannot be assumed to be driven by a stable institutional or bureaucratic
culture. It is nonetheless possible that some "missions" are so
inherently appropriate or attractive to presidential legal advisors that they will be adopted with a kind of inevitability that
does not depend on the operation of bureaucratic imperatives of
the usual kind. For OLC, the defense of the presidency seems
t o be an obvious candidate for such a mission, and separation
of powers does seem to be regarded as the soul of that office's
For those who serve in the office of the White House
Counsel, moreover, adopting the mission of defending the presidency would seem t o offer them a way of taking the edge off
their slightly unsavory reputation for politically driven lawyering.= The Bush administration should therefore show us what
can happen when lawyers with a commitment t o the separation

52. Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the W i e of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV.437 (1993).
53. This is illustrated in two recent articles written by OLC alumni: Douglas
W. Kmiec, O E s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV.337 (1993); McGinnis, supra note 31, at 432-35. Professor Kmiec's article discusses seven major examples of OLC's work, six of which are
analyzed primarily as problems in defining the scope of the president's authority.
Similarly, Professor McGinnis's only extended discussion of OLC's substantive legal
analysis involves that office's effort t o make a silk purse out of the earful that the
Supreme Court gave the executive in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
54. See, e.g., PATTERSON,supra note 9, at 141; Strine, supra note 18, at 11718 & n.35.
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of powers are elevated, or get themselves elevated, to the role
of serious policy players.
The record of the Bush administration also provides an
opportunity to test a n important hypothesis derived from game
theory. As Professor John 0.McGinnis has pointed out, the
actual practice of separation of powers can be described
through "a model in which governmental powers are often
distributed [not by the formal rules set out in the Constitution,
but] by the branches themselves through bargains and accommodations that maximize their respective interest^."^^ One
corollary of this model seems to be that the president should be
able to strengthen his bargaining position through a "pre-commitment strategy": by committing his prestige to the defense of
a set of publicly articulated principles, the president can
strengthen his own hand i n h t u r e negotiations because everyone will know that departures from those principles will be
more costly to the president than they would be if his prestige
were not already c ~ m m i t t e d .Under
~~
this view, President
Bush's visible elevation of the role played by his constitutional
lawyers could be seen as serving the president's interests at
least as much as it served those lawyers' interests: 'By articulating the principles that the executive will not concede, OLC
generates commitments for the h t u r e that may strengthen the
president's bargaining position vis-a-vis the other branches."57
If this plausible suggestion about the usefulness of "pre-cornmitment strategies" helps explain the development of the separation of powers, we should expect to observe significantly more
resolute and uncompromising behavior by the Bush administration than by the Reagan administration. The theory and evidence presented in this article, however, suggests that other
incentives operating on the president and his advisors render a
pre-commitment strategy untenable.

A. Implementation of the Legal Strategy: Veto Messages and
Signing Statements
President Bush's interest in promoting a coherent and
forceful legal strategy for defending the presidency had observ55. John 0.McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, LAW & CONTEMP.PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 293, 294.
56. See d. at 313-14 & n.106.
57. Id. at 314.
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able effects. Perhaps the most visible results of the initiative
emerged in his veto messages and in the signing statements he
issued when approving new legislation. The President vetoed
forty-six bills, citing constitutional objections in at least eleven
instances. I n five of these eleven cases, the bills would have
been vetoed for independent policy reasons, and might well not
have been vetoed on constitutional grounds alone? In two of
the eleven cases, however, the principal grounds for the
President's objection to the bill were constitutional in nature:'
and in four other cases constitutional objections were
the only apparent reason for his veto?' Remarkably, every

58. See Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 28 WKLY.COMP.PREs.
DOC. 1860 (Od. 3, 1992) (stating First Amendment objections but giving greater
emphasis to concerns that the bill would increase consumer costs); Message to the
Senate Returning Without Approval the National Voter Registration Act of 1992,
28 W a y . COMP.PREs. DOC. 1201 (July 2, 1992) (mentioning constitutional doubts
about the existence of congressional authority to supplant state regulation of elections while emphasizing the problems that the bill might create); Message to the
House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the National Institute of
Health Revitalization Amendments of 1992, 28 WKLY. Corn. PRES. DOC. 1132
(June 23, 1992) (emphasizing ethical, fiscal, administrative, and philosophical
grounds for objections as well as concerns relating to the Appointments Clause and
to interference with the president's authority to supervise his subordinates); Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Congressional Campaign
Spending Limit and Election Reform Act of 1992, 28 WKLY. COMP.PRES. DOC. 822
(May 9, 1992) (noting concerns with corruption and incumbency advantage as well
as First Amendment objections); Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Textile, Apparel, and Footwear Trade Ad of 1990, 26
WRLY. COMP.PRES. DOC. 1531 (Oct. 5, 1990) (noting adverse impact on consumers
as well as interference with president's discretion in foreign affairs and with
president's discretion under Recommendation Clause).
59. See Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval
the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1990, 25 WKLY. COMP.PREs. DOC. 1783 (Nov. 19, 1989) (interference with
president's discretion in foreign affairs); Message to the Senate Returning Without
Approval the Bill Prohibiting the Export of Technology, Defense Articles, and Defense Services to Codevelop or Produce FS-X Aircraft With Japan, 25 WKLY.COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1191 (July 31, 1989) (interference with president's discretion in foreign
affairs and with president's authority to supervise his subordinates).
60. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and
Excellence in National Environmental Policy Act, 27 WKLY. COW. PRES. DOC. 1877
@ec. 20, 1991) (Appointments Clause objection); Memorandum of Disapproval for
the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, 26 WKLY. COMP.PREs. DOC.
1958 (Nov. 30, 1990) (interference with president's discretion in foreign affairs);
Memorandum of Disapproval for the Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1990, 26
WKLY.COMP. PRES. DOC. 1839 (Nov. 16, 1990) (interference with president's discretion in foreign affairs); Message to the House of Representatives Returning
Without Approval the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and
1991, 25 WKLY. COW. PREs. DOC. 1806 (Nov. 21, 1989) (interference with
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veto that was based solely or primarily on constitutional
grounds involved a claimed invasion of the constitutional authority of the president's office, while at least two other bills
that the President deemed unconstitutional (although not a
threat to his office) were allowed to become law.61 President
Reagan, by way of contrast, seemed never t o have vetoed a bill
on the ground that it infringed on the president's authority,6'
although he sometimes included objections t o such infringements in messages dealing with vetoes that were based primarily on policy grounds.63Reagan, however, did veto at least two
bills on constitutional grounds unrelated t o presidential authority, including one that simply codified a regulation that the Supreme Court had previously upheld.64 Reagan frequently appresident's discretion in foreign affairs).
61. See Statement on the Children's Television Act of 1990, 26 W a y . COMP.
PREs. DOC. 1611 (Od. 17, 1990) (First Amendment); Statement on the Flag Protection Act of 1989, 25 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1619 (Oct. 26, 1989) (First
Amendment). In both cases, it should be noted, Bush allowed the bills to become
law, but withheld his approval. Despite Bush's refusal to approve the flag bill,
however, his Department of Justice enforced it and defended its constitutionality in
court. See Brief for the United States, United States v. Eichman, 496 US. 310
(1990) (NOS.89-1433, 89-1434).
62. Professor Douglas W. Kmiec seems to imply, contrary to my claim, that
the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988 was vetoed on constitutional grounds.
Kmiec, supra note 53, at 343. The President's statement explaining his veto, however, indicates that his principal objection to the bill was that it would have enabled "employees who are not genuine whistleblowers [to] manipulate the process
to their advantage simply to delay or avoid appropriate adverse personnel actions."
The President also discussed certain "serious constitutional concerns," but he went
no further than to say that these provisions "could not have been implementedn to
the extent they were inconsistent with the Constitution. Memorandum of Disapproval for the Whistleblower Protection Ad of 1988, 24 WKLY.COMP.PREs. DOC.
1377 (Oct. 26, 1988).
On at least two occasions, President Reagan vetoed bills that contained provisions to which he objected because they improperly permitted entities other than
the Congress to exercise legislative functions. See Memorandum of Disapproval of
S. 2166 (Indian Health Care Legislation), 20 WKLY.COW. PREs. DOC. 1583 (Od.
19, 1984); Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.J. Res. 338 (Desegregation h n d s for the Chicago Board of Education) Without Approval, 19
WRLY.COMP.PREs. DOC. 1133 (Aug. 13, 1983). This may or may not have reflected a principled concern with the separation of powers, but it does not imply a
vigorous defense of the presidency.
63. See, e.g., Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.R. 4868
Without Approval, 22 WKLY. COMP.PRES.DOC. 1281, 1282 (Sep. 26, 1986); Memorandum of Disapproval of H.R. 7336, 19 WKLY.COMP.PREs. DOC. 38 (Jan. 12,
1983); Memorandum of Disapproval of S. 2623, 19 WHLY.COMP.PREs. DOC.7 (Jan.
3, 1983).
64. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Children's Television Act of 1988,
24 WKLY. COW. PRES.DOC. 1456 (Nov. 5, 1988) (First Amendment objections);
Message to the Senate Returning S. 742 Without Approval, 23 WKLY. COW. PRES.
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proved bills containing constitutionally dubious restrictions on
his a u t h ~ r i t yand
, ~ ~ he signed into law at least four bills that
his administration later challenged in the courts as violations
of the president's constitutional powers?
A pattern similar t o that found in Bush's veto messages
can be found in his signing statements. Unlike the President's
veto messages, which are required by the Constitution, the
statements that presidents sometimes issue when they approve
new legislation are completely discretionary. Many presidents
have issued such statements from time to time, but serious
efforts to use them as a tool for advancing a coherent legal
strategy began only in the Reagan administration." Signing
statements can serve as such a tool in three principal ways: by
interpreting ambiguous statutory language in a manner that
the president hopes will be treated by the courts as a legitimate form of legislative history;68 by instructing the
president's subordinates in the executive agencies to resolve
Doc. 715 (June 19, 1987) (First Amendment objections). S. 742 would have codified
the so-called "fairness doctrine," which had been promulgated as a regulation by
the FCC and then sustained against a constitutional challenge in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). President Reagan's veto message recognized the holding in Red Lion, but openly disputed it. The President concluded: "S.
742 simply c a ~ o be
t reconciled with the freedom of speech and the press secured
by our Constitution. It is, in my judgment, unconstitutional." 23 WKLY.COMP.
PREs. DOC. a t 716.
65. See, e.g., Statement on Signing a Bill on Veterans' Benefits, 24 Way.
COMP.PREs. DOC. 1548 (Nov. 18, 1988); Statement on Signing S. 1874 Into Law,
. PREs. DOC. 1045 (Aug. 4, 1986); Remarks on Signing S. 2603 Into
22 W ~ YCOMP.
Law, 20 WKLY.
COMP.PREs. DOC. 1476, 1476-77 (Oct. 9, 1984); Statement on Signing H.R. 5712 Into Law, 20 WKLY.
COMP. PREs. DOC. 1201, 1201-02 (Aug. 30,
1984); Statement on Signing H.R. 3222 Into Law, 19 WKLY. COMP.PRES.DOC.
1619 (Nov. 28, 1983).
66. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (independent counsel statute);
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (statute that assigned an agent of Congress
authority to determine cuts in the federal budget); Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng%s, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986) (statute assigning a role in government procurement to an agent of Congress), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988);
Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988) (same), decision withdmwn in part, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v.
United States, 688 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1988) (statute restricting president's authority to protect confidentiality of national security information), vacated sub nom.
American Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 490 US. 153 (1989).
67. See Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Signif~ance of
Presidential Signing Statements, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 209, 210-12 (1988); Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and Political Aduantage, 12 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON.217, 226 (1992).
68. Such hopes have rarely been fulfilled. See, e-g., Cross, supra note 67, a t
234-35; William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Cri, (1991).
tique, 66 IND. L.J. 699, 702-03 & ~ . 1 4 17
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statutory ambiguities in a way favored by the presidentcg and
by creating a record that can be used later t o refute claims that
the president has approved of constitutionally dubious provisions in bills that the president has chosen to sign because of
his desire to see other provisions of the legislation become law.
During the Bush years, the constitutional issues addressed
in signing statements dealt mostly with questions of presidential authority, and they seem designed mostly to serve the
third purpose listed above, namely avoiding the appearance
that the President approved of objectionable provisions in legislation he signed. This concern with appearances is quite striking: Bush's signing statements are pervaded by an amazing
scmpulosity about the separation of powers that becomes at
times almost comical. Even a cursory review of the record suggests that the administration tried to i d e n t e and deal with
every issue, no matter how small, in every bill that was presented to the President. The lengths to which the Bush administration was prepared to go in applying legalistic analysis t o
enrolled bills, moreover, are suggested in the following droll
passage from the signing statement for the 1991 defense authorization bill:
[Slection 1409(a) refers to a classified annex that was prepared to accompany the conference report on this Act and
states that the annex "shall have the force and effect of law
as if enacted into law." The Congress has thus stated in the
statute that the annex has not been enacted into law, but it
nonetheless urges that the annex be treated as if it were law.
I will certainly take into account the Congress' wishes in this
regard, but will do so mindful of the fact that, according to
the terms of the statute, the provisions of the annex are not

Similarly, the President claimed in another signing statement
that provisions in a bill that purported to give the force of law
t o language in a classified annex t o the bill were legal nullities
because the annex was not presented to the President along
with the bilL7'
69. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 W ~ Y
COMP.PREs. DOC.1701 (Nov. 21, 1991).
70. President's Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1991, 26 WKLY.
COW. FQEs. DOC.1766, 1767 Wov. 5, 1990).
71. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 1990 and 1991, 25 W m . COMP. FQEs. DOC.1841, 1842 (Nov. 29, 1989).

.
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This kind of hyperlegalistic interpretation was complemented by a grand attempt at comprehensive scrutiny. Each
year, for example, the President issued a statement claiming
that all legislative veto provisions would be treated as legal
nullities.72Numerous signing statements challenged the legal
validity of provisions that restricted the president's discretion,
and the President sometimes seemed to threaten that he would
act in defiance of the objectionable provisions. On a t least four
occasions, he went so far as t o obtain a legal opinion from OLC
concluding that it would be lawful for him to disregard a statutory provision,73and he apparently acted contrary to statutory
direction in at least one case.74Although the President's constitutional objections to statutory provisions arose most often in
the context of Bush's principal interest, foreign affairs,75many

72. See Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service, and General GovCOMP.PRES. DOC. 1873, 1874 (Od. 6,
ernment Appropriations Act, 1993, 28 WKLY.
1992); Statement on Signing the District of Columbia Mental Health Program Assistance Act of 1991, 27 WKLY. COMP.PRES. DOC. 1575 (Oct. 31, 1991); Statement
on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1991, 26 W W . COMP.PRES. DOC. 1768, 1769 (Nov. 5, 1990); Statement on
Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act,
1990, 25 WKLY. COMP.PREs. DOC. 1669, 1670 Wov. 3, 1989).
One student of the legislative veto has counted more than 200 newly enacted
legislative vetoes between the time of the Supreme Court's Chudha decision in
1983 and the end of the 102nd Congress in 1992. Louis Fisher, The Legislative
PRoBs., Autumn 1993, 273, at 288.
Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, LAW & CONTEMP.
73. Compare Statement on Signing the Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1992, 27 WKLY.
COW. PRES. DOC. 1529 (Oct. 28, 1991) with Issues Raised by sec. 129 of Pub. L.
No. 102-138 and sec. 503 of Pub. L. No. 102-140, 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 18
(1992) (preliminary print); Compare Statement on Signing the National and Community Service Act of 1990, 26 WKLY. COW. PREs. DOC. 1833, 1834 Wov. 16,
1990) with Appointment of Members of the Board of Directors of the Commission
on National and Community Service, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 173 (1990) (preliminary print); Compare Statement on Signing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, 26 WKLY. COW. PRES. DOC. 1764, 1765-66 (Nov. 5, 1990) with Constitutionality of subsection 4117(b) of Enrolled Bill H.R.5835, the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 170 (1990) (preliminary
print); Compare Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
COMP.PRES.DOC. 266, 267 (Feb. 16, 1990)
Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 26 WKLY.
with Issues Raised by Section 102(c)(2) of H.R. 3792, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 38
(1990) (preliminary print).
74. Despite a statutory requirement that representatives of a legislative body
be included in the United States delegation to the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, these negotiations appear to have proceeded without the
inclusion of such legislative representatives. See McGinnis, supra note 55, at 310
11.81 (citing interview with former staff member of the National Security Council).
75. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for
COMP. PREs. DOC.2073 (Oct. 23, 1992); Statement on
Fiscal Year 1993, 28 WRLY.
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dealt with matters, such as the arcana of the Appointments
and Recommendation Clauses, in which he could not possibly
have taken a passionate interest."
It is impossible t o assess with certainty whether the Bush
administration's veto and signing statement strategy will prove
to have any lasting effects. The strategy was defensive, consisting almost entirely in resisting new congressional encroachments into areas that were thought t o be reserved by the Constitution to the Executive's discretion. In order t o measure the
consequences of this resistance, one would need to determine
what precedents would have been created but for the resistance, and t o determine what significance those precedents
would have had in the hture. Once the Clinton administration
begins to establish its own approach to veto messages (if there
prove t o be any) and signing statements, some useful comparisons may begin to emerge. On the evidence that now exists,
however, i t remains quite possible that the Bush
administration's strategy amounted to little more than a kind
of gesturing through which it sought to signal its intention-or
reserve its rights-to seize ground from Congress if the opportunity to do so ever arose. Absent evidence that such opportunities arose and were taken, it is difficult t o see how Bush's veto
messages and signing statements could have any real or lasting
importance.

B. Compromise of the Constitutional Vetoes
The four Bush vetoes that were apparently based solely on
constitutional grounds reinforce this suspicion. They are therefore worth examining is some detail, for their contribution t o
legal and political developments can only be understood by
examining the reasoning on which they were based and by
observing how the President subsequently dealt with what
proved to be ongoing disputes.

Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Ad, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 27
WRLY.COMP. PREs. DOC.1526 (Oct. 28, 1991); Statement on Signing the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Ad, 1990, 25
W ~ YCOMP.
.
PREs. DOC.1810, 1811 (Nov. 21, 1989).
76. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Reclamation States Emergency
Drought Relief Act of 1991, 28 WW. COMP.PREs. DOC.413 (March 5, 1992);
Statement on Signing the Bill Modifving the Boundaries of the Alaska Maritime
National Wildlife Refuge, 26 W m . COMP.PRES.DOC.1897 (Nov. 21, 1990).
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1. The Appointments Clause
One minor piece of pork barrel legislation sponsored by a
Democratic Senator was vetoed solely because of provisions
that violated the Appointments Clause.77This bill, which was
named in honor of former Congressman Morris Udall, would
have assigned authority t o make determinations about eligibility for Federal funds to a board dominated by members not
appointed by the president. President Bush emphasized in his
veto message that his refusal to approve the bill was based
solely on constitutional grounds and that he had no substantive
or policy objections to the legislation. But when the President
was presented with a successor bill that he deemed constitutionally invalid because of a different type of Appointments
Clause violation, he signed it anyway.78Fidelity t o the constitutional analysis that provoked the f i s t veto thus proved less
than thoro~ghgoing.'~
President Bush's concession in this case can usefully be
contrasted with another incident in which he was more successful in getting what he wanted. When he approved the National
and Community Service Act of 1990,8O Bush issued a signing
statement discussing what he regarded as constitutional defects in the provision establishing a commission created by the
statute to administer the most important programs established
in the act. Under the statute, various restrictions were placed
on the president's freedom t o choose nominees for this commission. The President regarded these restrictions as violations of
the Appointments Clause, and said that they were "without
legal force or effect."'
77. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and
Excellence in National Environmental Policy Ad, 27 WKLY.COMP.PRES. DOC. 1877
(Dec. 20, 1991).
78. See Statement on Signing the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence
in National Environmental and Native American Public Policy Act of 1992, 28
WIUY. COMP.PRES.DOC. 507 (March 19, 1992). Adding insult to injury, the second
bill treated the President's pocket veto of the first bill as a nullity by purporting
to repeal legislation that Bush had purported to veto. See id.
79. The Senator who sponsored the bill was chairman of the appropriations
subcommittee with jurisdiction over the Office of Management and Budget, which
may help explain the President's lack of policy objections to the bill as well as his
compromise on the constitutional issues. For accounts of the influence of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget during the Bush administration, see
OF D O M E ~POLICY
C
IN THE
CHARLE~
KOLB,WHITEHOUSEDAZE:THE UNMAKING
BUSHYEARS (1994); JOHN
PODHOREIZ,HELLOF A RIDE:B A C ~ A GATETHE WHITE
HOUSEFOLLIES1989-1993 (1993).
80. Pub. L. No. 101-610, 104 Stat. 3127 (1990).
81. Statement on Signing the National and Community Service Act of 1990,
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So long as the President refused to nominate candidates
for the commission, the congressionally mandated programs
could probably not have been administered." In his signing
statement, the President also indicated that while he was not
particularly enthusiastic about the programs that this commission was t o implement, he strongly favored a separate part of
the act that authorized funding for one of his own favorite
progra~ns.'~Congress therefore had reason to believe that the
President might very well rehse to make the nominations
required by the statute. In a burst of speed that would otherwise be mystifying, Congress passed remedial legislation bringing the statute into conformity with the President's view of the
Appointments Clause early in the next legislative session?
What distinguishes this case from the one involving the Udall
bill is that here the President's political and policy interests
were fvmly aligned with his interest in the Appointments
Clause, whereas the objections to the Udall bill seem to have
been rooted solely in constitutional principle.
2. Presidential control over foreign policy

In late 1990, President Bush vetoed a bill dealing with
export controls on certain goods with military applications
because of provisions requiring that sanctions be imposed on
countries that use or distribute chemical and biological weapons. The President did not object to such sanctions on policy
grounds, and he made this clear by signing an executive order
that directed the imposition of the same sanctions contained in
the bilLg5What he did object to was the "rigid" and "mandatory" imposition on him of a legal obligation to impose the sanctions, which interfered with what he called his "constitutional
responsibilities" t o conduct the nation's foreign policy.86

26 WKLY. COMP. ~ E s DOC.
. 1833, 1833-34 (Nov. 16, 1990).
82. See Appointment of Members of the Bd. of Directors of the Comm'n on
Nat71 and Community Serv., 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 173 (1990) (preliminary
print).
83. 26 WKLY. COMP.PREs.DOC. at 1833.
84. See National and Community Sew. Technical Amendments Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-10, 105 Stat. 29 (1991).
85. The executive order was signed before the bill was vetoed, and was referred to in the President's veto message.
86. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Omnibus Export Amendments
Act of 1990, 26 WKLY. COW. PREs. DOC.1839, 1839 (Nov. 16, 1990).
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Although the President's objection t o the export control bill
was clearly rooted in his understanding of the constitutional
separation of powers, he did not claim that such interference
violated the Constitution. His constitutional objections were
also not clearly distinguishable from his concerns about immediate practical consequences that the bill might have during
what proved to be the prologue t o the Gulf War: "The mandatory imposition of unilateral sanctions as provided in this bill
would harm U.S. economic interests and provoke friendly countries who are essential t o our efforts to resist Iraqi aggres~ion."~'The relative importance of these practical concerns
was confirmed, after the Gulf War had been successfully prosecuted, when the President signed a bill with mandatory-sanctions provisions that differed little from those to which he had
objected earlier." This outcome, together with the attenuated
nature of the President's original constitutional objections,
makes it impossible to regard his veto of the original version of
the mandatory sanctions as an important sign of commitment
to constitutional principles.

3. Congressional responses to Iran-Contra
The two other vetoes that President Bush exercised on
constitutional grounds were more significant, but they, too,
were followed by compromises that substantially undercut their
importance. The vetoed bills were part of a highly complex
struggle between the Bush administration and the Congress
over legislative efforts to prevent a repetition of certain activities that had occurred in connection with the Iran-Contra affair. In simplified form, many individuals on the Hill were
determined 1)to require that Congress be kept fully and contemporaneously informed about covert actions (like the arms
sales t o Iran); and 2) to ensure that when Congress placed
limits on the president's ability to take certain foreign policy
actions directly (like the limits placed at times on assisting the
Contras), the president would not be able to take those same

87. Id. The bill was presented to the President only a few weeks before
American and allied troops invaded Iraq.
88. See Foreign Relations Authorization Ad, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993,
Title V, Pub. L. No. 102-138, 105 Stat. 647, 722 (1991); Statement on Signing the
COMP.
Foreign Relations Authorization Ad, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 27 WKLY.
PREs. DOC.1526 (Oct. 28, 1991).
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actions indirectly by imposing on other nations to carry out
activities prohibited by U.S. law.
In late 1989, President Bush was presented with a bill that
made it a felony for anyone in the Executive t o "assist" others
(including foreign governments) in carrying out diplomatic
initiatives that the Executive itself is prohibited by statute
from pursuing directly. The bill also required the president to
notify Congress whenever anyone in the Executive "advocates,
promotes, or encourages" the provision of material assistance
by others for activities that the Executive itself is forbidden by
statute to assist with or undertake.89As President Bush noted
when he vetoed this bill, its vague and sweeping provisions
threatened to interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs by
exposing diplomats and other officials to the threat of imprisonment for engaging in discussions that might later be found to
constitute a prohibited form of "assistance." President Bush
also observed that the threat t o the president's constitutional
role in conducting foreign relations was heightened by the fact
that those who serve in Congress would remain free t o engage
in the very diplomatic activities forbidden to the Exec~tive.~'
The resulting timidity and disarray in the conduct of foreign
policy, said the President, would be "wholly contrary to the
allocation of powers under the Constit~tion."~'
The following year, President Bush vetoed another bill that
would have had similar effects. This second bill contained a
complex set of provisions designed t o force the president t o
notify Congress about covert actions more promptly than President Reagan had informed the legislature about the secret
.~~
part of this effort to
arms sales to Iran during the 1 9 8 0 ' ~As
ensure greater congressional involvement in the conduct of
covert actions, the bill defined such covert actions t o include
any "request" by our government to a foreign government or
private citizen to conduct a covert action on behalf of the

89. The full text of the provision, which is summarized here, can be found in
section 109 of H.R. 1487, which was vetoed on November 21, 1989. A complete
legal analysis of this provision would require a more extended discussion of various
terms and qualifications than is necessary here.
90. See Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 25 WRLY.
COMP. PREs. DOC.1806 (Nov. 21, 1989).
91. Id. at 1806.
92. The full text of the provisions can be found in Section 602 of S. 2834,
lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), which was vetoed on November 30, 1990.
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United States. This definition was sufficient to provoke the
President's veto (although the provisions dealing with notifications to Congress about covert actions were no less important).g3 In language reminiscent of that used the previous
year, President Bush criticized the bill's vagueness about the
meaning of reportable "requests," and complained that this
vagueness "could have a chilling effect on the ability of our
diplomats to conduct highly sensitive discussions concerning
Because the
projects that are vital to our national ~ecurity.'"~
contested provision of this bill did not forbid diplomatic discussions but only required that they be reported, and because it
did not include provisions for criminal sanctions, it could not
easily be characterized as unconstitutional (and the President's
veto message did not use that term). President Bush's decision
t o veto the bill therefore seemed to reflect a serious determination t o resist congressional meddling in the prerogatives of his
office and t o preserve the traditional separation of powers even
beyond what he saw as the strict requirements of the Constitution.
It should come as no surprise that President Bush was
most aggressive in his defense of the authority of his office in
the field of foreign relations, where his expertise and interest
were greatest. The veto messages dealing with prohibited forms
of "assistance" and with reportable "requests" reflect this emphasis, and they are also typical of the highly nuanced and
sophisticated constitutional analysis that runs consistently

93. The provisions of the bill dealing with the timing of the president's
obligatory notifkation of covert actions were part of a separate constitutional and
policy dispute between the Congress and the President. The story of that dispute's
origins and development is quite complicated, but the result can be summarized in
simple terms: President Bush reluctantly made concessions on this issue, as he did
on the others reviewed in this article. Compare The President's Compliance with
the 'Timely Notification7 Requirement of Section 501(b) of the National Security
Act, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 159, 173-74 (interpreting the National Security Act
to leave the president "virtually unfettered discretion" to choose when to notify
Congress of covert actions) with Pub. L. No. 102-88 $ 602, 105 Stat. 429, 441-44
(1991) (reenacting the operative language on timely notification); H.R. REP.NO. 66,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (conference report on the bill that became Pub. L. No.
102-88) (rejecting OLC's conclusion and interpreting the reenacted language to
require notification "within a few days"); Statement on Signing the Intelligence
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, 27 WKLY.
COMP.PREs. DOC. 1137, 1137 (Aug.
14, 1991) (expressing pleasure that the revised provision on timely notification "incorporates without substantive change the requirement found in existing law").
94. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Intelligence Authorization Act,
Fiscal Year 1991, 26 WKLY.
COMP.PRES.DOC. 1958 (Nov. 30, 1990).
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through almost all of the Bush veto messages and signing
statements. Viewed in isolation, however, these two veto messages could be quite misleading. First, it should not be overlooked that the group of officials most directly threatened by
these two bills was composed of career foreign service officers,
a potent interest group within the government and one that
counted among its own the man then serving as Deputy Secretary of State (and later as Secretary). More important, the
Bush administration proved willing to compromise, and in a
very serious way, exactly the principles that seemed to be a t
the center of the President's decisions to veto these two bills.
To see how this happened, one has to begin by examining
yet another bill that was vetoed in 1989. Two days before he
vetoed the bill that would have prohibited American officials
from "assisting" others in certain foreign policy activities, President Bush had vetoed a n appropriations bill that contained two
provisions that he said were unacceptable. One of those provisions had to do with funding for abortions in countries receiving U.S. foreign aid. The other provision, which was sponsored
by Representative David Obey and which closely resembled the
vetoed ban on "assistance," would have prohibited the use of
certain appropriated funds either "for the purpose of furthering
any military or foreign policy activity which is contrary to [express prohibitions in] United States law" or "to solicit the provision of funds by any foreign government (including any instrumentality or agency thereof), foreign person, or United States
person, for the purpose of furthering any military or foreign
policy objective which is contrary to [express prohibitions in]
United States law."g5 The Obey Amendment also contained
provisos that purported to leave U.S. officials Gree to express
their own views or those of the president. When he vetoed the
bill, President Bush acknowledged that these provisos might
allow the Obey Amendment to be constmed i n a way that he
would consider constitutionally acceptable. He nevertheless
complained that "the section as a whole remains sufEciently
ambiguous to present a n unacceptable risk that it will chill the
conduct of our Nation's foreign affairs?

95. The full text of the provision is set out in H.R.2939, which was vetoed
on November 19, 1989.
96. Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Ad,
1990, 25 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC.1783, 1784 (Nov. 19, 1989) (emphasis added).
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The President's decision to veto this bill because of ambiguities in the Obey Amendment that created an "unacceptable
risk" of chilling the conduct of our foreign relations, however,
did not turn out to be the end of the story. Because this amendment was a rider to an appropriations bill sent to the President
near the end of a congressional session, the legislature had to
respond to the President's veto by passing a new bill. Two days
later, the President signed a new version of the bill, from which
the controversial abortion-funding provisions had been removed. The Obey Amendment, however, remained in the bill in
a slightly modified form. Under the new version, American officials were barred from providing appropriated funds t o any
foreign government or other person "in exchange for" that government or person undertaking an action that U.S. law expressly prohibited the American officials themselves from engaging in.
President Bush's signing statement recognized that the
new version of the Obey Amendment, though less sweeping
than the first, had the same kind of potential to chill the conduct of foreign affairs: "Many routine and unobjectionable diplomatic activities could be misconstrued as somehow involving
a forbidden 'ex~hange."'~'Why then did the President sign the
bill? Following a pattern characteristic of many Bush signing
statements, in which he interpreted objectionable provisions so
as t o render them consistent with his view of the Constitution
(though often completely inconsistent with the statutory lang ~ a g e ) ?the
~ President contended that the Obey Amendment

97. Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, 25 W W . COMP. PREs. DOC. 1810,
1811 (Nov. 21, 1989).
98. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Reclamation Projects Authorization
COMP. PREs. DOC. 2232, 2233 (Oct. 30,
and Adjustment Act of 1992, 28 WRLY.
1992); Statement on Signing the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, 28 WKLY.
COW. PREs. DOC.2185 (Oct. 28, 1992); Statement on Signing the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, 28 WRLY.
COMP.P ~ s DOC.
.
2073 (Oct. 23,
1992); Statement on Signing the Reclamation States Emergency Drought Relief Act
of 1991, 28 WKLY.
COMP.PRES. DOC. 413 (March 5, 1992); Statement on Signing
COMP. PREs. DOC. 1873
the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1991, 27 WKLY.
(Dec. 19, 1991); Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1769 (Dec. 5, 1991);
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 27 WKLY.
Statement on Signing the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1843 (Nov. 16, 1990); Statement
Reauthorization Act, 26 WKLY.
on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, 26 WKLY.
COMP. PREs. DOC. 1766 (Nov. 5, 1990); Statement on Signing the North American
Wetlands Conservation Act, 25 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1949 @ec. 13, 1989);
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covered only transactions "in which U.S. funds are provided to
a foreign nation on the express condition that the foreign nation
The signing
provide specific assistance t o a third ~ountry.'"~
statement also maintained that because the Obey Amendment
applied only where U.S. law "expressly prohibits" American
officials from taking an action, it would not apply where U.S.
statutes "merely limit funding to undertake such an action."loO
The President's interpretation was in some respects simply
irreconcilable with the statutory language. The Obey Amendment, for example, unambiguously referred to exchanges with
any "foreign person or United States person," not just to exchanges with "foreign nation^."'^' Similarly, the Obey Amendment prohibited U.S. officials from inducing others to undertake "any action" that the American government is forbidden
from taking, not just actions in which a foreign nation "provide[~]specific assistance to a third country." Where the
President's interpretation of the Obey Amendment's text was
not preposterous, it was far-fetched. The natural and obvious
meaning of the phrase "in exchange for" clearly covers implicit
agreements as well as transactions based on an express condition, especially in a statutory provision that carefully distinguishes implicit from express prohibitions. And there is precious little room in the statute's language for the President's
claim that laws which limit funding for certain activities do not
expressly prohibit U.S. officials from providing funding in excess of those limits; on the contrary, it has for a very long time
been a felony, pursuant to an express and general statutory
prohibition, for government officials to make expenditures beyond the limits set in appropriations legislation.lo2
In a desperate attempt t o shore up his utterly implausible
interpretation of the Obey Amendment's language, President
Bush sought t o rely on the amendment's legislative history to

Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1990, 25
WRLY.
COW. PRES.DOC. 1809 (Nov. 21, 1989).
99. Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, 25 WKW. COW. PREs. DOC. 1810,
1811 (Nov. 21, 1989) (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. Compare Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-167, 103 Stat. 1195 (1989) with 25
WKLY. COW. PRES. DOC.at 1811.
102. 31 U.S.C. $8 1341, 1350.
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show that his interpretation reflected congressional intent. But
he had little to rely on. Flouting standard canons of statutory
construction, the Bush signing statement ignored those portions of the legislative history that courts consider the most
reliable indicia of legislative intent, such as statements by the
sponsor of the provision in question (which in this case was
Representative Obey, who chaired the appropriations subcommittee with jurisdiction over the bill). Instead, President Bush
referred vaguely t o statements by Representative Mickey Edwards (the ranking Republican on the subcommittee), and to a
colloquy between two Republican Senators (Kasten and
Rudman).lo3
When one examines the legislative history of the Obey
Amendment, the flimsiness of the administration's legal argument becomes even more apparent. Representative Obey made
it clear that the intent of his amendment was to prohibit appropriated funds from being "expended in any way t o promote
or entice other governments t o support policies which would be
illegal if followed by the United state^."'^^ Representative
Edwards, moreover, who helped negotiate the fmal version of
the Obey Amendment and'on whom the Bush signing statement purports t o rely, never said that the Amendment requires
an express agreement. Edwards said that a violation of the
provision would have t o be based on a "quid pro quo," which is
just another way of describing the provision of funds "in exchange for" some action.'" The term "quid pro quo" no more

103. 25 WKLY. COMP.PRES. DOC.at 1811.
104. 135 CONG.REC. H9088 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989). See also id. at H9089
(amendment says that "if this administration wants to try to accomplish a foreign
policy purpose, which is contrary to a specific prohibition in U.S. law, it cannot
use money in this bill to do itwstatement of Mr. Obey).
105. See id. at H9089 (statement of Mr. Edwards). There is one statement in
the Congressional Record that might seem to offer some support for the President's
interpretation. The day after the bill containing the Obey Amendment was passed
by the House of Representatives, Obey went on the floor and declared (on behalf of
himself and Representative Edwards) that "the word 'exchange' should be understood to refer to a direct verbal or written agreement." 135 CONG.REC. H9231
(daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989). This statement does not go as far as the Bush signing
statement, for a "directn agreement would not necessarily have to be an "express"
agreement, but it does go further in the direction favored by the President than
prior statements by Obey and Edwards had gone. Under standard canons of statutory construction, however, the statement of November 21 would be difficult to use
as a meaningful indicator of congressional intent because it was made after legislative action on the bill had been completed.
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excludes implicit agreements than the statutory "in exchange
for" language does.'"
The President's invocation of Representative Edwards'
statements t o support his narrow construction of the Obey
Amendment was baseless, and his reliance on a colloquy between Senators Kasten and Rudman was not much better.
Immediately after the House passed the bill containing the
Obey Amendment, the Senate debate began. At the end of that
debate, Senator Kasten offered a substitute amendment that
would have replaced the Obey provision with language forbidding U.S. officials from providing appropriated funds pursuant
t o agreements under which, "as an express condition for receipt
of such assistance," the recipients would undertake military or
foreign policy activities that are illegal under American
law.''
Kasten, who was openly serving as the Bush
administration's agent on this issue, withdrew this amendment
after engaging Senator Rudman (who had generally opposed
the administration's position on related issues) in a planned
colloquy. According to the transcript of the colloquy in the Congressional Record, Rudman asserted that violations of the Obey
Amendment should not give rise to criminal penalties, and that
the words "in exchange for" should be understood to refer to
agreements under which U.S. aid is provided on the "express
condition" that the recipient undertake an action that U.S.
officials are legally forbidden t o carry out.lo8
Because no objections were raised to Senator Rudman's
interpretation, which the record indicates was offered on the
floor immediately before the bill containing the Obey Amendment was passed by the Senate, the Kasten-Rudman colloquy

106. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1892 (1992) ( K e ~ e d y ,

J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment):
The requirement of a quid pro quo means that without pretense of any
entitlement to the payment, a public official violates § 1951 if he intends
the payor to believe that absent payment the official is likely to abuse
his office and his trust to the detriment and injury of the prospective
payor or to give the prospective payor less favorable treatment if the quid
pro quo is not satisfied. The official and the payor need not state the
quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law's effect could be
frustrated by knowing winks and nods. The inducement from the official
is criminal if it is express or if it is implied from his words and actions,
so long as he intends it to be so and the payor so interprets it.
Id.
107. 135 CONG.REC.S16361 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989).
108. Id. at S16362-63.
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may not be completely worthless as an indicator of the Senate's
intent.logEven if one assumes that the colloquy firmly establishes that the Senate's interpretation of the Obey Amendment
was the same as the President's, however, the record in the
House does not support that interpretation, at least with respect t o whether a violation must be based on an express
agreement. And since the meaning suggested by the debates in
the originating chamber is more consistent with the language
of the provision, a disinterested interpreter such as a court
would almost certainly reject the construction put on the statute in the Bush signing statement.
It is true that the second version of the Obey Amendment
was less threatening to the president's conduct of foreign affairs than either of the predecessor versions that President
Bush used his veto to stop. The President's signing statement,
moreover, may have helped prevent the new law from being
used as a tool of partisan or ideological combat. But President
Bush gave up a great deal when he signed the bill containing
the second version of the Obey Amendment. To see how much
he surrendered, one need only look at his signing statement's
claim that the Senate record made it clear that "neither the
criminal conspiracy statute, nor any other criminal penalty"
would apply t o violations of the Obey Amendment."' Even if
one assumes, perhaps somewhat heroically, that the courts
would apply the rule of lenity (which counsels that ambiguous
statutes should be construed in favor of criminal defendants),
such legislative history could not prevent an Independent
Counsel from procuring indictments based on the general con-

109. One commentator has attempted to make the Kasten-Rudman colloquy
seem irrelevant by falsely asserting that "their colloquy concerned an amendment
that Senator Kasten himself withdrew when it faced rejection by Congress."
PRESIDENCY:
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S
CHARLESTIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN
STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING WITHOUT CONGRESS39 (1994). Although Kasten's
amendment was before the Senate when the colloquy took place, the colloquy itself
"concerned" the Obey Amendment. Kasten, moreover, withdrew his own amendment
because he accepted the colloquy as an adequate substitute for his own amendment, and Tiefer does not demonstrate that "it faced rejection by Congress." While
it would be naive to think that the Kasten-Rudman colloquy could possibly have
served the administration's interests as well as the Kasten Amendment would
have, it would equally be naive (or tendentious) to assume without proof that the
Obey Amendment could have been enacted without the concession to the President
that was embodied in the Kasten-Rudrnan colloquy.
110. Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, 25 WKLY. COMP.PREs. DOC. 1810,
1811 (Nov. 21, 1989).
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spiracy statute."' Lawrence Walsh had done this and more
when he prosecuted Oliver North and others for conspiring t o
obstruct government functions by evading two of the so-called
Boland Amendments (which put restrictions on aid to the Nicaraguan Contras)." Everyone concerned clearly understood
that the Obey Amendment was an effort to make it easier (not
more difficult) to discourage government officials from engaging
in activities like those engaged in by the targets of Walsh's
investigations. Nor could anyone who was involved in the conduct of foreign policy during this period have had less than an
acute awareness of the costs that an Independent Counsel can
impose on his targets even when he fails t o make his criminal
charges stick. Neither the president nor anyone else could
assure American diplomats either that similar indictments for
violating the Obey Amendment would not be brought or that
the courts would rule against the validity of such prosecut i o n ~ . "To
~ the extent that American diplomats chose to take
their legal advice from the President's signing statement, or
from the more elaborate but equally dubious legal opinion subsequently issued by OLC,ll4 the Obey Amendment could have
had little chilling effect. But when one considers how reckless
or self-sacrificing it would have been t o take the President's
statement as legal advice, any notion that the President's concession in signing the Obey Amendment into law was an unimportant surrender dissipates like the insubstantial haze of the
legal analysis in the signing statement itself.ll5
111. 18 U.S.C. $ 371 (Supp. 1995). This statute authorizes prosecutions for
conspiracies to commit offenses that are not themselves criminally punishable. See
United States v. Hutto, 256 U.S. 524 (1921).
112. Technically, Walsh did not charge North and the others with conspiracy
to violate the Boland Amendments, but this seems only to have been a matter of
trial tactics. In his final report, Walsh said: "Independent Counsel could as a matter of law have framed the conspiracy charge in that fashion, and its evidence at
trial would have proved that the conspirators violated the Boland Amendment."
LAWRENCE
E. WALSH,IRAN-CONTRA:
THE FINALREPORT67 (1994).
113. The President's signing statement, together with a legal opinion based on
it, see Criminal Penalties Under Pub. L. No. 101-167, Section 582, 14 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 93 (preliminary print 1990), that was later issued by the Justice
Department, might have been sufficient to justify the Attorney General in refraining from seeking the appointment of an Independent Counsel for alleged violations
of the Obey Amendment. As the Iran-Contra prosecutions illustrated, however, an
Independent Counsel appointed because of other alleged legal violations would be
free to procure an indictment based on violations of the Obey Amendment.
114. Id.
115. The Obey Amendment has been reenacted in subsequent appropriations
bills. The current version can be found in Pub. L. No. 103-87, $ 533, 107 Stat. 931
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C. The War Powers Resolution
President Bush's use of veto messages and signing statements-which articulated, without insisting on, an aggressive
view of his constitutional prerogatives-resembles his approach
t o the War Powers Res~lution."~Section 4(a)(1) of this statute, which was enacted over President Nixon's veto in 1973, requires that the President file a report with Congress within
forty-eight hours after U.S. forces are introduced "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstance^."^^^ A report under this section of the statute triggers a sixty-day deadline
within which the president is required to terminate the use of
military forces unless Congress authorizes their continued
depl~yment."~The president is also required t o report certain other kinds of military deployments in foreign nations, but
these do not trigger a deadline that would force him t o seek
congressional authorization.
Like other presidents beginning with Nixon, President
Bush regarded the sixty-day limit as unconstitutional. Except
for one ambiguous reference to section 4(a)(l) by President
Ford after the Mayaguez incident, no president has ever submitted a report acknowledging that the sixty-day clock had
been triggered.llg While technically complying with a narrow
construction of the reporting requirements of the War Powers
Resolution, President Bush was relatively aggressive in asserting the statute's irrelevance t o his conduct. After using American air power to help suppress a coup in the Philippines, for
example, Bush notified Congress of the actions he had taken,
but sought to avoid conceding that his military decisions could
be constrained by that statute:
This measured action by U.S. Forces was taken at my direction in accordance with recognized principles of international

(1993). When he signed this legislation into law, President Clinton made no mention of the Obey Amendment. See Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Legislation, 29 WKLY. COMP.PRES.DOC.1945 (Sept. 30, 1993).
116. 50 U.S.C. $8 1541-1548 (1988).
117. Id. $ 1543(a).
118. Id. $ 15446).
119. Thomas M. Franck, Rethinking War Powers: By Law or By "Thaumaturgic
Inuocation"?, 83 AMER. J . INPLL. 769 & n.13 (1989). The Ford administration
conceded that the evacuation of Saigon fell within section 4(aX1), but this concession came after the time had lapsed for a report under that section. Overview of
the War Powers Resolution, 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 271, 278 (1984).
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law and pursuant to my constitutional authority with respect
to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander in
Chief. I am mindful of the historical differences between the
Executive and Legislative branches and the positions taken
by me and all my predecessors in office with respect to the
constitutionality of certain provisions of the War Powers Resolution. I am sharing this information with you consistent
with that Resol~tion.'~~

A few weeks later, the President ordered the invasion of Panama. Once again noting that his report was t'consistent with"
(not "pursuant to") the War Powers Resolution, the President
said the invasion:
was necessary to protect American lives in imminent danger
and to fillfill our responsibilities under the Panama Canal
Treaties. . . . The military operations were ordered pursuant
to my constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of
foreign relations and as Commander in Chief.l2l

The following year, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the President grew bolder still. In his letter notifying Congress of substantial troop deployments to the Gulf, he said that Iraq's military was "capable of initiating further hostilities with little or
no additional preparation," and that "Iraq's actions pose a direct threat to neighboring countries and t o vital U.S. interests
in the Persian Gulf region."lP Despite this reference to further hostilities, however, the President implied that the sixtyday clock in the War Powers Resolution had not been triggered,
and that in any event the statute would not affect the
President's military decisions:
I do not believe involvement in hostilities is imminent; to
the contrary, it is my belief that this deployment will facilitate a peacefbl resolution of the crisis. If necessary, however,
the Forces are M l y prepared to defend themselves. Although
it is not possible to predict the precise scope and duration of

120. Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate on United States Military Assistance to the Government of the Philippines,
25 W m . COMP.PREs. DOC.1867, 1868 (Dec. 2, 1989).
121. Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the
COW. PRBS.
DOC.
Senate on United States Military Action in Panama, 25 WKLY.
1984, 1985 (Dec. 21, 1989).
122. Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate on the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia and the
Middle East, 26 WKLY.COW. PRES.
DOC.1225 (Aug. 9, 1990).
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this deployment, our Armed Forces will remain so long as
their presence is required to contribute to the security of the
region and desired by the Saudi government to enhance the
capability of Saudi armed forces to defend the Kingdom.

I have taken these actions pursuant to my constitational
authority to conduct our foreign relations and a s Commander
in Chief.123

Despite frequent claims that Bush and other presidents have
evaded the War Powers Resolution, or deliberately avoided
compliance with it,'24 the statute's language has made it fairly easy for presidents to engage in what they saw as appropriate military actions without having to flout its terms or even to
acknowledge that the constitutionally questionable sixty-day
clock had begun t o run.'" As the examples above illustrate,
President Bush took full advantage of the statute's wording to
avoid the risk of acting in clear contravention of its terms.
Events in the Gulf, however, finally closed off this path.
As it became clear that Iraq was unlikely to surrender its
ambitions in the face of threats and economic sanctions alone,
the President was apparently undecided about the advisability

.

123. Id. After a large deployment of additional forces later that year, President
Bush again notified Congress of what he had done. In this case, however, he did'
not even mention the War Powers Resolution. He did, however, restate his belief
that hostilities were not "imminent." Letter from President George Bush to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate, 26 WKLY.COMP. PRES. DOC. 1834, 1835 (Nov. 16, 1990).
HONGJUKOH, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY
CONST~ION:
124. See, e.g., HAROLD
AFFAIR 39, 133, 190 (1990); McGinnis,
SHARINGPOWERAFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA
supra note 55, at 316 & 11.117, 319; Rolph, supra note 50. But cfi KOH, supra, at
112, 126-27 (seeming to acknowledge that there has been a high degree of presidential compliance with the strict terms of the War Powers Resolution). Presidents
have certainly construed every ambiguity in the War Powers Resolution in their
own favor, and one can make plausible arguments against some of these presidenCONSITI'Utial interpretations. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
TIONAL LESSONSOF VIETNAMAND ITS AFTERMATH 49 & n.10 (1993); ROBERTF.
TURNER, REPEALING
THE WARPOWERSRESOLUTION:
RESTORING
THE RULE OF LAW
IN US. FOREIGNPOLICY 122 (1991). While the Presidents' interpretation of the
statute (as of the Constitution) may be disputable, so are the interpretations of the
presidents' critics. No court has ever held that any president has violated the War
Powers Resolution, and Congress itself has never voted to tighten its language or
to impose new requirements that were omitted from the existing version.
125. This is not to say that the War Powers Resolution has had no effect.
Some military operations, for example, may have been conducted in a way calculated to avoid triggering certain provisions of the statute. See, e.g., TURNER,supra
note 124, at 137 (American military advisers in El Salvador forbidden t o cany M16 riiles).
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of seeking congressional authorization for a military offensive.
Administration officials had consistently maintained that such
authorization was not legally required,126and the Secretary
of Defense is said t o have worried that prosecution of the war
would become impossible if Congress voted against authorizing
the use 'of force.ln The President, however, decided to seek
congressional authorization before attacking Iraq, and he succeeded in obtaining iti
The President's decision may have been politically prudent,
and it may even have reflected a consensus among his legal
a d v i ~ 0 r s . lSubsequent
~~
events, however, by no means' disproved the argument attributed t o Secretary Cheney: that if
the use of force turned out to be successful and the costs were
reasonably low, it would not matter what kind of debate or vote
there had been in Congress, whereas if the military operation
failed or the costs of victory were very high, prior congressional
authorization would not save the President from taking the
blame.
President Bush, moreover, clearly passed up an obvious
opportunity t o frustrate congressional efforts to establish a
precedent adverse t o his claims about the unconstitutionality of
the War Powers Resolution. When he asked Congress for legislation, the President was careful not to ask for statutory "authorization," but only for a bill stating that Congress "supports
the use of all necessary means to [liberate K u ~ a i t ] . " 'And
~~

126. E.g., David Hoffman, Baker Says Iraq Is Abusing Hostages; Health of
American Wuman Shields' Reported to Be Deteriorating, WASH.POST,Oct. 30, 1990,
at A1 ("Bush said yesterday he believes he has ample authority to act in the gulf
without prior approval from Congress. 'History is replete with examples where the
president has had to take action,' Bush said. 'And I've done this in the past and
certainly . . . would have no hesitancy at all.'"); US'. Policy in the Persian Gulfi
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess.
(Oct. 17, 1990) (testimony of Secretary of State Baker); Crisis in the Persian Gulf
Region: U S . Policy Options and Implications: Hearings Before the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, l O l s t Cong., 2d Sess. @ec. 3, 1990) (testimony of Secretary of
Defense Cheney).
THE COMMANDERS
343-44 (1991).
127. BOBWOODWARD,
128. One journalist reports that there was general agreement among the
President's legal advisors about the desirability of obtaining congressional authorization. Apparently reflecting this wnsensus, the Deputy Attorney General (who at
that time was William P. Barr) is said to have advised the President that he had
the authority to proceed unilaterally, but nonetheless recommended that congressional authorization be obtained because "[wlar is in the gray zone." Id. at 344-46.
129. Id. at 344.
130. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 27 WKLY.
COMP. PRES. DOC. 17, 18 (Jan. 8, 1991).
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when he was presented instead with legislation expressly providing the legal authorization required by the War Powers
Res~lution,'~'the President's signing statement emphasized
that
my request for congressional support did not, and my signing
this resolution does not, constitute any change in the
long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the
President's constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces
to defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the
War Powers Res01ution.l~~

The President may not have conceded that he needed this resolution as a legal matter, but after he requested a mere resolution of support and then signed this one instead, his claims
about the legal irrelevance of the War Powers Resolution could
themselves only look quite irrelevant.

D. Summary
President Bush's signing statements and veto messages,
like his statements about the War Powers Resolution, displayed a consistent and relatively aggressive approach t o the
separation of powers issues that arose from congressional efforts to subject the administration t o a variety of statutory
restrictions. In this sense, the Bush record represents a kind of
triumph for the academically oriented lawyers responsible for
crafting the President's statements.'= Upon closer examination, however, this victory appears t o have been one more of
form than substance. The aggressive signing statements do not
appear to have reflected much actual resistance to congressional control, and each of the vetoes based on constitutional objections was followed by substantial compromise of the principles on which those vetoes were based. With respect to the
War Powers Resolution, President Bush simply (though per-

131. Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991).
132. Statement on Signing the Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military
Force Against Iraq, 27 WKLY. COMP.PRES. DOC. 48 (Jan. 14, 1991).
133. For many years, OLC has attracted lawyers with prestigious educational
records, and many have gone on to academic careers. McGinnis, supra note 31, at
422, 424 & 11.185. During the Bush administration, C. Boyden Gray (himself a
former Supreme Court clerk) broke with prior practice by hiring people with similar paper credentials to work in the White House Counsel's office. See The True
Believers, 23 National Journal 2018 (Aug. 17, 1991).
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haps sensibly) flinched when presented with circumstances in
which he could have put his bold words t o a test.

IV. THREERETREATS FROM THE ADMINISTRATION'S
CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES
If the lawyers' "successes" do not seem to suggest that
their role in the development of separation of powers law was
particularly important, the lawyers9 "failures" provide even
stronger evidence that their influence did not amount to much.
The Bush record shows that his administration was simply
unwilling to defend its theories of the Constitution on several
important occasions. A brief look at some of these departures
from the principled jurisprudence articulated in the Bush signing statements and veto messages will help to illuminate the
forces that discourage a thoroughgoing implementation of a
principled jurisprudence of the separation of powers.

A. Legislative Vetoes
Early in its tenure, the Bush administration sought t o be
done with the contentious matter of the Nicaraguan Contras,
which had been inherited from President Reagan. After investing a significant amount of his own time in negotiations, the
Secretary of State reached an agreement with congressional
leaders that provided temporary b d i n g to support the
Contras. Part of these so-called "Central American Accords"
required the administration t o promise in writing that no money would be used to support the Contras after a date certain
unless the chairmen of four congressional committees approved
the continued funding in writing.ls4 Neither OLC nor the
Counsel to the President (nor for that matter the State
Department's own Legal Adviser) was consulted about this
arrangement,'" which incorporated a formal legislative-veto
device that would clearly have been unconstitutional under the
Chadha decision had it been adopted in legislation.ls6 There
was speculation in the press that personal factors may have
134. See Robert Pear, Unease is Voiced on Contra Accord, N.Y.RMEs, March
26, 1989, at Al, col. 5. Although the Central American Accords between the President and Congress were published by the Executive, the part of the agreement
discussed here was omitted from the published version. See Bipartisan Accord on
Central America, 25 WRLY. COMP.PRES. DOC.420 (March 24, 1989).
135. See Pear, supra note 134.
136. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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contributed to the absence of advance consultations, and it can
hardly be doubted that the Secretary of State and the Counsel
to the President had an uneasy relationship.ls7 But there was
no suggestion that the agreement's impact on the president's
ability to protect the authority of his office was overlooked. On
the contrary, one State Department official who took part in
the negotiations was quoted as saying that "the precedential
aspects of this agreement were well and truly understood" by
Secretary of State Baker and other negotiators.ls8 Instead, it
appears that the President decided that resolving the very
contentious issue of aid to the Contras was simply more important than maintaining a principled opposition to the use of
legislative vetoes. The fact that the newly inaugurated President felt quite free to make this decision without consulting
OLC, the Counsel to the President, or any other legal officer in
the government, is a striking illustration of how unlikely it is
that a president would ever allow the concerns that lawyers
have with the interests of his office to determine his conduct in
that office.
The flap over the agreement to comply with a non-statutory legislative veto attracted considerable attention because the
Counsel to the President made the mistake of voicing his objections in the press.lsg During the ensuing years, however, no
attention at all was paid the fact that President Bush routinely
signed bills containing real legislative vetoes that clearly violated the Chadha rule, unlike the Contra funding agreement
(which was not technically unconstitutional). Although the
President also routinely issued statements denouncing the
congressional practice of including such 'legal nullities" in bills
that were presented to him,140 I have found no recorded example of the Bush administration's refusing t o comply with any
of the innumerable legislative vetoes to which it was subjected.
Nor does the Bush administration seem t o have taken any
137. See, e.g., Bernard Weinraub, Gray-Baker Vendetta: A Long-Running Tale
Intrigue, N.Y.RMEs, March 29, 1989, at A16, col. 1.
138. Pear, supra note 134; see also Helen Dewar & David Hoffman, Baker Denies Contra-Aid Agreement Sets Precedent for Power-Sharing: Draft Letter on Assistance Plan Circulating Among Hill Leaders, WASH.POST,April 8, 1989, at A9;
R.W. Apple Jr., A Balance of Bush, the Congress and the Contras, N.Y. TIMES,
April 2, 1989, at Dl, col. 1.
139. See Pear, supra note 134; Bendavid, supra note 5, at 14 ("'I
was right to
object,' Gray maintains. 'But Secretary Baker was mad, understandably so, because
I had talked to the press before raising the matter in-house.'").
140. See supra note 72.

Of Potomac
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other action that might have discouraged the Congress from
flouting one of the few apparently significant post-Watergate
Supreme Court victories for the ofice of the president.l4l

B. The Appointments Clause
It is easy to imagine why President Bush might make the
trade-off between politics and principle that he accepted in the
Central American Accords, especially when one considers that
the arrangement did not involve an actual violation of the Constitution. The same cannot be said, however, of another departure from well-settled principles of the separation of powers.
On August 9, 1989, President Bush signed into law the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 ("FIRREA"), which effected a massive restructuring of the
regulatory regime governing the savings-and-loan industry. As
part of that restructuring, an independent agency known as the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") had most of its
functions transferred to a new entity, called the Office of Thrift
Supervision ("OTS"), which was located within the Department
of the Treasury. When he signed the bill, President Bush did
not mention that the new statute contained a provision that
purported to appoint as the first Director of OTS the individual
who had been Chairman of the FHLBB.142
Such a provision, under which an officer of the United
States is appointed by statute, is about as clear a violation of
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution as one could hope
to fmd. If one were familiar only with the fastidious attention
to Appointments Clause issues that pervades the Bush

141. For a detailed study of the struggle within the Reagan administration
over the litigation strategy that led to the successful attack on the legislative veto,
see BARBARA
-ON
CRAIG,CHADHA:
THE STORYOF AN EPIC C O N ~ O N A L
STRUGGLE
(1988). The post-Chadha pattern, in which legislative vetoes are usually
imposed in appropriations bills rather than in substantive legislation (probably
because of the special powers of intimidation possessed by appropriators), suggests
that the principal effect of Chadha, to the extent it has had any at all, may have
been a slight shift in the relative power of congressional appropriations committees
in comparison with authorizing committees. Legislative vetoes, especially committee
vetoes, have of course also continued to be exercised through extra-statutory mechanisms, as Chadha clearly permits. Neither Bush nor any other president seems to
have made much of an effort to curb this practice, which could hardly be less
objectionable than the Contra funding agreement. For examples of the use of extrastatutory mechanisms, see Fisher, supra note 72, at 288-91.
142. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, $ 301, 103 Stat. 183, 278.
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administration's signing statements and with the President's
decision to veto one bill solely because of a less clear-cut violation of the Appointments Clause,'43 acquiescence in the statutory appointment of a federal officer might be surprising, or
even shocking. The President's failure to object t o this element
of the bill when he signed it, however, becomes easier to understand when one recognizes the still more extraordinary fact
that the Bush administration had itself proposed the same kind
of illegal statutory appointment in a savings-and-loan bill it
had transmitted to the Congress a few months earlier?
This blunder led directly t o litigation brought by a thrift
whose assets OTS was threatening to seize.'45 In the course
of the law suit, which challenged the authority of OTS to act on
the ground that its director had been unconstitutionally appointed,'" the Director resigned and was eventually replaced
by an official appointed in the constitutionally prescribed manner. Before that happened, however, the Bush administration
put forward the desperate argument that the statutory appointment was valid because the chairmanship of the FHLBB and
the directorship of OTS were the same office, a position emphatically rejected by the district court.'" This litigation,
which threatened serious disruption of OTS' regulatory work,
143. Memorandum of Disapproval for the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and
Excellence in National Environmental Policy Act, 27 WKLY. COMP.PRES.DOC. 1877
(Dec. 20, 1991).
144. 135 CONG.REC. 51513, $1535-36 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989).
145. Olympic Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision,
732 F. Supp. 1183, 1191-92 (D.D.C.), dismissed as moot, 903 F.2d 837 @.C. Cir.
1990).
146. The plaintiff that brought the constitutional challenge was represented by
Charles J. Cooper, who had been Assistant Attorney General for OLC during the
Reagan administration.
147. 732 F. Supp. 1183, 1192-93 (D.D.C. 1990). The court also rejected a number of efforts by the government to evade the Appointments Clause through bootstrapping arguments based on the Vacancies Act and on an alleged "inherent power" of the president to fill vacant offices without regard to the Appointments
Clause. These efforts, too, were rejected by the court. Id. at 1193-1200.
Ironically, one of the greatest differences between OTS and the FHLBB is that
OTS falls clearly under the president's legal control, while the FHLBB did not. It
is diBcult to imagine, however, that the long-term benefits to the constitutional
order that might be thought to result from the abolition of a single independent
agency could outweigh the risks to that order that were presented by the Justice
Department's defense of the statutory appointment. Apparently, this thought eventually made an impression on the Justice Department itself, which went out of its
way in a subsequent case t o endorse the position adopted by the District Court in
the FIRREA litigation. See Brief for the Respondent, 1991 WL 521272, at *40,
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 US. 868 (1991) (No. 90-762).
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became moot when a new Director was confirmed by the Senate and appointed by the President."'
Given the Bush administration's scrupulous attention to
the Appointments Clause in other contexts, including one veto
that was based solely on an Appointments Clause objection,14' its flagrant disregard of constitutional forms in this
case is quite striking. William P. Barr, who served at the head
of OLC when the President signed the bill enacting the violation into law, has publicly stated that OLC "recognized an
Appointments Clause problem" in the bill.lSOHe also reports
that many people in the Treasury Department and Congress
thought it was "absurd" to worry about such an issue, so that
"the views of the Department of Justice were overridden. Political deals were made, and the bill passed."151Read carefully,
Barr's account is highly revealing. First, it refers only to a bill
in which OLC '%ecognized"a constitutional "problem." No mention is made of the fact that the Bush administration itself had
formally proposed adopting the blatantly unconstitutional statutory appointment mechanism. Second, there is no suggestion
that OLC's constitutional objections were communicated to the
President or to the White House Counsel. Nor is there any
suggestion that the Department of Justice recommended that
the President veto the bill, despite Barr's statement in the very
same paragraph that "[wlhen a provision raises constitutional
difficulties, in most cases the Attorney General should recommend veto."152It is hard to resist the inference that the De148. Olympic Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Director, Office of ThriR Supervision,
903 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 907 (1991).
149. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and
Excellence in National Environmental Policy Act, 27 WRLY.COMP. PREs. DOC. 1877
(Dec. 20, 1991). The President also expressed his concern with the Appointments
Clause in his signing statements. E.g., Statement on Signing the Bill Modifying the
Boundaries of the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge, 26 WnY. COMP.
PREs. DOC. 1897 (Nov. 21, 1990); Statement on Signing the National and Community Service Act of 1990, 26 WRLY.COW. PREs. DOC. 1833 (Nov. 16, 1990).
150. William P. Barr, Attorney General's Remarks, Benjamin Cardozo School of
Law, November 15, 1992, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 31, 38 (1993).
151. Id.
152. Id. In conjunction with this statement, Barr went on to say that an Attorney General who believes that a bill is unconstitutional should recommend that
it be vetoed even if he also believes that the courts would uphold it. He then cited
an academic article (written by an OLC alumnus) contending that the president is
obliged by the Constitution to veto such bills. Id. at 38 11.33 (citing Michael B.
Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 735, 77176 (1983)). Absent from this passage is any discussion of whether the Assistant
Attorney General for OLC might have an obligation to ensure that his view of the
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partment of Justice was cutting its own "political deals" with
those at Treasury and on the Hill who thought OLC's concerns
were "absurd."
What might the "political deals" involving the unconstitutional appointment provision have involved? Press speculation
centered on the theory that the Bush administration-as the
price for bringing the functions performed by the FHLBB under
the control of the Treasury Department-acquiesced in a
scheme t o install the Chairman of the FHLBB, who had close
personal ties t o a powerful Republican Senator, as Director of
OTS. Under this theory, the unconstitutional appointment
(which was strongly opposed in the House of Representatives)
was necessary to avoid codmation hearings involving someone who had been intimately involved in the operation of the
FHLBB. The reason for this, in turn, was that such hearings
had the potential t o embarrass other Senators who were suspected of having improperly interfered with regulatory decisions of the FHLBB.153None of this suggests what interests
the Justice Department (in contradistinction t o the Treasury
Department) might have had in participating in any political
deals, though one could easily come up with plenty of hypotheses. The most important conclusion for present purposes, however, does not require a choice among such hypotheses. What
the FIRREA episode suggests is that circumstances can arise in
which the president's constitutional lawyers themselves bargain away the interests of his office for purposes of their own
even in an administration in which the president himself has
made the defense of that office an important goal. That this
may have happened during the Bush administration is a reminder that the president's lawyers have interests other than
serving their client--even (or especially) if their client is assumed to be the presidency itself. The Justice Department's
acquiescence in the unconstitutional statutory appointment
may therefore be usefuily compared with the phenomenon
illustrated by the Contra funding incident. Just as the presi-

Constitution's requirements is conveyed to the president.
153. See, e.g., Robert A. Rosenblatt & Sara Fritz, S&L Bailout Compromise ReApril 6, 1990, at Dl, col. 2; Editorial, Trying
turns to Haunt Congress, LA. TIMES,
Days for the Thrifi Bailout, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE
MONITOR,March 27, 1990, at 20;
Editorial, Another S&L Delay, WASH.POST,March 26, 1990, at A10; Court Gives
Thrifi Agency A Reprieve, WASH.POST, March 24, 1990, at D12; Jerry Knight,
Court Ruling Disrupts Thrift Bailout: Judge Holds Top Regulators' Appointments
Unconstitutional, WASH.POST,March 22, 1990, at A l .
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dent has interests that he must weigh against those of the office he holds, so his lawyers may be tempted to forego the interests of his ofice to pursue an agenda of their own.

C. The Mask of "Complicated and'lndirect Measures"
The Contra-funding and FIRREA examples expose some
important forces that necessarily limit any single-minded pursuit of the institutional interests of the presidency. Whatever
intrinsic importance one may attach to the principles at stake
in these incidents, however, neither departure from principle
was likely to produce a truly large or enduring effect on the
structure of government or on the law of the separation of
powers. For an illustration of the Bush administration's abandonment of constitutional principles when something very significant was actually at stake, it is useful to examine the history of the Supreme Court's decision in Metropolitan Washington
Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc. ("Airports Case")? This case proved to be an important victory for the interests of the president's office-in
fad, it was probably the most important case involving those
interests decided during the Bush administration. But the
outcome was one that the President's lawyers actually opposed
in the courts.
The Airports Case arose from a congressional effort t o
create an ingenious substitute for the legislative veto device
that the Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional in
Chadha. To the extent relevant here, the story begins in 1984,
when a consensus developed that capital improvements at
Washington National and Dulles Airports could best be carried
out if operating control and financial responsibility for the
airports were transferred from the federal Department of
Transportation t o some sort of newly created state, local, or
interstate entity? In 1986, after consultations among executive agencies and interested congressional staffers over the best
means of effecting such a transfer, OLC reviewed three different proposals that would have given Congress substantial pow-

154. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
155. See Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth., 718 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd, 917 F.2d 48 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2 in the Joint Appendix filed with the Supreme Court
in the Airports Case. Dulles and Washington National were the only two civilian
airports operated by the federal government.
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ers to supervise the new entity.'" These powers were in the
nature of legislative vetoes, and were manifestly intended to
substitute for the informal oversight powers that Congress and
certain of its officers and committees had been exercising i n the
normal course of administration while control of the airports
was vested in the Department of Transportation.
Under one proposal, state authorities would have been
authorized to operate the airports, but Congress would have
created a board of review comprising several members and
officers of Congress; this board would have been empowered to
veto the most important decisions of the new operating authority. OLC emphatically rejected this proposal because it would
constitute a legislative veto in violation of Chadha. Under a
second proposal, Congress would have required Virginia and
the District of Columbia to establish the same kind of review
board under state law, as a condition of their being allowed to
gain control of the airports. Characterizing this proposal as one
that presented "complex and novel questions involving the
relationship between federal and state grants of authority,"
OLC gave a n elaborate legal analysis and concluded, despite its
"grave reservations" about the proposal's constitutionality, that
"a colorable argument" could be made in its defense.'''
The third proposal was similar to the second proposal except that a) the members of the review board would serve i n
their "personal capacities" as users of the airport and not as
representatives of Congress, and b) the members of the review
board would be members of Congress appointed by the new
state operating authority from a list of names submitted by the
congressional leadership. OLC declared that this proposal
would probably withstand constitutional scrutiny, and declined
to object to it on legal grounds.

156. See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3 in the Joint Appendix filed with the Supreme
Court in the Airports Case. This document is a letter from the Assistant Attorney
General for Legislative Affairs to the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation. The detailed constitutional argumentation in the letter, however, could hardly have been provided
by any office other than OLC. And OLC does in fact routinely draft such letters.
Kmiec, supm note 53, at 338. Although the letter characterizes the three proposals
reviewed in it as "alternatives proposed by your s t d , " there had apparently been
some prior consultations and it is not clear that all the ideas reflected in these
alternatives necessarily originated with congressional staff. On the contrary, it is
quite conceivable that OLC itself devised one or more of the alternatives.
157. OLC's reservations arose largely from INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), and Bowsher v. Synar, 478 US. 714 (1986).
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The provision finally enacted in 1986 closely resembled the
third proposal, which had been cleared by OLC earlier that
year. After Virginia and the District of Columbia enacted the
required enabling legislation, and the Secretary of Transportation entered into long-term leases with the new operating authority, the board of review was appointed from lists provided
by the congressional leadership. In 1988, a citizens' suit was
brought, challenging the new arrangement on the ground that
the veto power granted to the board of review was unconstitutional.
In 1989, afier George Bush became president, the District
Court ruled that the legislative veto device created through the
statute was constitutional. Appeal was taken, and the Department of Justice intervened in the Court of Appeals to defend
the constitutionality of the statute.'" The Court of Appeals,
however, reversed the district court, holding that the device
violated the separation of powers because the members of the
board of review were in reality agents of the Congress.'"
At this point, the Justice Department began behaving in
an equivocal manner. Although it had intervened in the Court
of Appeals to defend the constitutionality of the statute, it
declined to join the airport authority's petition for certiorari?' When the Supreme Court granted the petition, the Unitand it filed a
ed States automatically became a re~pondent,'~~
brief on the merits that offered the Court little more than an
expression of the government's ambivalence.
This ambivalence might more accurately be described as
incoherence. On the one hand, the Justice Departmentla argued that the mere fact that the board of review was created
pursuant to state law did not preclude its being characterized
as an agent of Congress, and therefore invalid under Chadha
(which forbids legislative vetoes) or under Bowsher (which
forbids agents of Congress fiom exercising executive authori-

158. See 718 F. Supp. at 975.
159. See the docket entries in the Joint Appendix fled with the Supreme
Court in the Airports Case.
160. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth., 917 F.2d 48, 56-57 0 . C . Cir. 1990).
161. See Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 US. 252, 262-64 (1991).
162. Id. at 264 & n.12.
163. Because the Solicitor General was disqualified from this case, the brief
was filed by one of his deputies.
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ty).'" The Justice Department's brief correctly observed that
treating the board of review as a mere creature of state law
would open "a massive loophole in the separation of powers."
To permit such influence laundering would allow Congress to
require the states, as a condition of receiving federal financial
assistance, to appoint members of Congress to state offices
controlling the administration of virtually all roads, schools,
housing, and health care, thereby completely supplanting the
federal agencies through which the president performs his
central function of executing t h e federal laws. In a stunning
effort to evade the compelling logic of this argument, however,
the Justice Department then claimed that the statute at issue
in the Airports Case was constitutionally valid. Noting that
members of Congress on the board of review were supposed to
serve in their "personal capacities," the Justice Department
contended that such individuals were especially well suited to
represent the interests of all other users of the airports because
members of Congress must make fkequent trips between Washington and their home districts. The Court was invited to
imagine that members of Congress would somehow be appropriate representatives of airport users because they use the
airports heavily, while they would not be appropriate representatives of those who use roads, schools, and hospitals because
they merely partake in those programs to the same extent as
other citizens.
The Supreme Court understandably dismissed this argument by observing that the facts of the case "belie the ipse dixit
that the Board members will act 'in their individual capacities.'"lB5 Rather than accept this "individual capacity" fiction,
the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the
board-of-review device, although difficult to characterize, logically must be either a n effort to exercise legislative power i n
violation of Chadha o r a n attempt to exercise executive power
i n violation of B o w ~ h e r . ' ~Repudiating
~
t h e Justice
Department's unprincipled suggestion that the Court uphold
the statute while essentially confining the case to its facts,
Justice Stevens forcefully explained why such ad hoc constitutional decision-making should be avoided:

164. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v. Spar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986).
165. 501 U.S. at 267.
166. Id. at 275-76.
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One might argue that the provision for a Board of Review is
the kind of practical accommodation between the Legislature
and the Executive that should be permitted in a "workable
government." Admittedly, Congress imposed its will on the
regional authority created by the District of Columbia and the
Commonwealth of Virginia by means that are unique and
that might prove to be innocuous. However, the statutory
scheme challenged today provides a blueprint for extensive
e x p a n s i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t i v e power beyond i t s
constitutionally-confined role. Given the scope of the federal
power to dispense benefits to the States in a variety of forms
and subject to a host of statutory conditions, Congress could,
if this Board of Review were valid, use similar expedients to
enable its Members or its agents to retain control, outside the
ordinary legislative process, of the activities of state grant
recipients charged with executing virtually every aspect of
national policy. As James Madison presciently observed, the
legislature "can with greater facility, mask under complicated
and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on
the co-ordinate departments." Heeding his warning that legislative "power is of an encroaching nature," we conclude that
the Board of Review is an impermissible encroachment.'"

Perhaps the best that can be said about the Justice
Department's brief is that it supplied the Supreme Court with
the key argument needed for understanding the threat that the
board-of-review device posed t o the separation of powers. By
contending that the argument did not apply in this case, however, the Government's brief created a risk that the Court
would misapprehend how serious that threat was. The significance of that risk is suggested by the fact that three dissenting
Justices emphasized how odd it was that the Court was reaching out t o protect the president's authority from a threat that
the President's own lawyers denied was real: "Should Congress
ever undertake such improbable projects as transferring national parklands to the States on the condition that its agents
control their oversight, there is little doubt that the President
would be equal to the task of safeguarding his or her interests."16'

167. 501 U.S. at 276-77 (footnote and citation omitted).
168. Airports Case, 501 U.S. at 293 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Justice White did not explain the distinction between national parklands and national airports.
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How can the strange behavior of the Justice Department
be explained? The first crucial step obviously came in 1986,
when OLC approved the scheme that was eventually invalidated by the Supreme Court. This approval seems manifestly
inconsistent with OLC's institutional propensity t o resist congressional efforts to undermine the principles articulated in
Chadha and Bowsher, and it is easy to imagine that OLC's
1986 decision reflected policy pressures from the Department of
Transportation and the Office of Management and Budget.
These agencies would undoubtedly have been more concerned
with paying the price demanded by Congress for relieving the
government of financial commitments and onerous operating
responsibilities than with the niceties of constitutional law.
Once OLC's clearance was obtained, and the statute was enacted, it is not the least bit surprising that the Justice
Department's litigating divisions defended the scheme when it
was challenged in court. The Department's litigation bureaucracies are strongly predisposed to defend the constitutionality
of federal statutes, and they would have had little or no incentive to second-guess OLC's earlier approval of this one.
Surprisingly, the Justice Department continued to take
this approach even after President Bush came into office and
gave the defense of the presidency the kind of apparently serious backing that it had lacked during the Reagan administration. The Bush administration was notorious for its efforts t o
avoid being perceived as "Reagan's third termT6' and it
would have been easy t o abandon the Reagan-era OLC position
when the Justice Department first entered the case in 1989.
Even if one assumes that the case did not at that time receive
the kind of serious attention within the Department that this

In other cases, too, the Justice Department displayed an unwarranted faith in
the president's ability or inclination to protect the interests of his office. See, e.g.,
Brief for Respondent, 1991 WL 521272, at *27, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S.
868 (1991) (arguing that president and Executive Branch "can be expected vigorously to challenge legislative encroachments on presidential prerogatives under [the
Appointments] Clause"). The FIRREA case discussed above was a recent and striking illustration of how dubious this proposition is, but it was by no means unique.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 119 (1976) (illustrating an instance in
which the Executive defended an invasion of the president's prerogatives under the
Appointments Clause). In both the FIRREA and BucMey cases, the courts at least
partly rescued the legal interests of the Executive from the Executive's effort to
impair its own powers.
169. Cf. Peggy Noonan, Why Bush Failed, N.Y. TIMES,Nov. 5, 1992, at A35,
col. 2 (analyzing the results of these efforts).
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would have required, it would have been perfectly possible for
the Department to change its position after the Court of Appeals bestowed upon the President a significant and unaskedfor victory. Such confessions of error by the government are not
common, but they are a traditional and well-accepted element
of the Justice Department's practice.170So long as they do not
become so frequent as to undermine the Government's credibility in the courts, their only negative effect is the embarrassment they cause to whichever individuals approved the position
later abandoned by the Government.171 Thus, the fear of such
embarrassment is the likeliest cause of the Justice
Department's failure to change its position in the Airports Case.'"
170. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Perspectives on the Judiciary, 39 AM. U. L.
REV. 475, 484-85 (1990); John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor
General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799,
807 & n.45 (1992).
171. President Bush himself demonstrated no reluctance to order the Justice
Department to change its position in the Supreme Court when something he really
cared about was at stake. After meeting with representatives of interests materially affected by a case that was before the Court, President Bush ordered his Solicitor General to file a brief contradicting the position that the Solicitor General
had taken in an earlier brief to the Court in the very same case. See Reply Brief
for the United States, 1991 WL 538730, at *9-10 & n.*, United States v. Mabus,
502 U.S. 936 (Nos. 90-1205, 90-6588). Linda Greenhouse, Bush Reverses U.S.
Stance Against Black College Aid, N.Y. TIMES, O d . 22, 1991, at B6; Ruth Marcus,
Bush S h i s Stand on Aid to Black Colleges; Administration Now Supports InPOST, Oct. 23, 1991, at A6; cf.
creased State Funding in Mississippi Case, WASH.
Linda Greenhouse, U.S. Changes Stance in Case on Obscenity, N.Y. TIMES,November 11, 1994, at A15. col. 1 (Solicitor General's position disavowed in subsequent
brief signed by the Attorney General).
172. This suggestion is reinforced by the history of another separation of powers case that arose during the Bush administration. Pursuant to the statutory
provisions governing the operation of the Tax Court (which is an Article I tribunal), the chief judge of the Tax Court appoints "special trial judges" to hear and
decide certain kinds of cases. When the constitutionality of these appointments was
challenged, the Justice Department at Grst defended their legitimacy on the theory
that the Tax Court is a "court of law" within the meaning of the Appointments
Clause. Upon realizing that the President himself had publicly rejected just such a
characterization in a signing statement for a bill dealing with an analogous Article
I tribunal, the Justice Department changed its position and began arguing that the
chief judge of the Tax Court is the "head of a department" for purposes of the
Appointments Clause. Although it might seem obvious and inevitable that the
Justice Department would revise its position to conform with the President's (especially since the President's position was undoubtedly formulated by the Justice
Department itself), this apparently did not happen without a battle royale between
OLC (which favored the interpretation more favorable to the interests of the presidency) and the Justice Department's Tax Division (which would have been the
source of the original "court of law" interpretation). See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, App. G, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Daniel Klaidman,
Burr Takes Hard Line on Executive Power; Senate Mulls AG Nominee's Record, LE-
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If inertia was propelling the Justice Department t o defend
this statute in the courts, the Court of Appeals' decision does
seem to have introduced a bit of wobble into the trajectory, for
the Justice Department declined to seek certiorari after that
decision. But the Department was never actually deflected from
its course, even though its own brief in the Supreme Court
clearly showed why a decision upholding the statute would
pose a serious threat t o the interests of the presidency. The fact
that the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court were both far
more willing than President Bush's own Justice Department t o
defend the institutional interests of the presidency in this case
is highly suggestive, especially when this incident is considered
together with the FIRREA case. Judicial precedents are by
nature more powerfd than the kinds of precedents about which
the administration was so s c ~ p u l o u sin its signing statements
and veto messages. Despite the Bush administration's rhetorical commitment to the legal defense of the presidential office,
the most enduring victory for that office was imposed by the
courts in the face of outright resistance by President Bush's
lawyers. Thus, when the outcome mattered most, the Bush
administration was at its weakest in defending the president's
constitutional interests.
Lest one think that bureaucratic glitches or other special
circumstances within the Justice Department are sufficient t o
explain the way the Airports Case was handled, the adminis-

GAL TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1991, at 1. If it was diff~cultfor the Justice Department to
change its litigating position in this case-where different components of the Department had already taken different positions on the critical issue (probably without either of them knowing what the other was doing), and where the President
himself had already addressed the issue (albeit without knowledge of the incipient
dispute)-it would presumably have been far more difficult to procure a change of
position in the airports litigation. And, since there were apparently no overriding
political imperatives in either case, it is reasonable to suppose that the different
outcomes in the two cases resulted from the interplay of normal forces of bureaucratic inertia and personal vanity.
It should also be noted that although the Justice Department did manage in
the Tax Court case to present the Supreme Court with a constitutional analysis
that was more consistent with the president's interests than its original position, a
bare majority of the Court nonetheless adopted the conclusion that the Justice
Department had originally advocated, and the Court's opinion took note of the
change in the government's position. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868,
888 n.5 (1991). The portion of the Freytag opinion dealing with this issue is so
poorly reasoned (and was so incisively criticized in Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in the judgment) that it is entirely conceivable that its conclusion was able to
attract a majority of the Court only because the government itself had originally
advocated the same conclusion.
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tration later confirmed that deeper forces were at work. A few
months after the Supreme Court refused the invitation to create what the President's own lawyers called "a massive loophole in the separation of powers," Congress passed a bill
amending the airport statute in response to the Court's decision. This bill included yet another desperate effort by Congress to retain its control over Dulles and Washington National
by creating a new board of review that differed only superficially from the one that had been invalidated. Although membership on the new board was not in terms restricted to members
of Congress, the board's members had to meet certain qualifications that few people outside Congress would possess, and the
congressional leadership was given complete control over choosing candidates for the board. The new board also lacked a n
absolute veto over the operating authority's decisions, but it
was given the power to delay (for up to six months) important
actions with which it disagreed.
This congressional persistence in the pursuit of a n unconstitutional goal can probably be explained by a strong and
bipartisan fear that a state-controlled airports authority might
inconvenience members of Congress by shifting some flights
from the overburdened facilities a t Washington National to
Dulles w o r t (which is several miles farther from the Capitol).
Members may also have been concerned that they might lose
the reserved, free parking places that they now enjoy at both
airports.'" Although the President said that he considered
this new device unconstitutional, he signed the bill into law
anyway, blandly commenting that the courts would have to
deal with the constitutional pr0b1em.l~~
This latest congres173. On April 20, 1994, the Senate rejected a proposal that would have invited
the airport operating authority to stop providing free parking near the Dulles and
Washington National terminals to members of Congress. See 140 CONG.REC.
54511-19, S4524 (daily ed. April 20, 1994). Five days later, the airport operating
authority removed the signs at the reserved parking areas that read: "Reserved
ParkingISupreme Court JusticedMembers of Congress/Diplomatic Corps." The reserved parking areas for members of Congress remained exactly where they had
always been, but new signs were installed that say: "Restricted ParbinglAuthorized
Users Only." Karen Foerstel, Signs Designating Members' Parking Are Removed
From Both Airport Lots, ROLLCALL,May 16, 1994.
174. See Statement on Signing the Intermodal Surface Transportation Effieiency A d of 1991, 27 WRLY.COMP. PREs. DOC. 1861 (Dee. 18, 1991). The Bush
administration appears never to have cleared up its pathetic confusion about the
Airports Case, Shortly before leaving office, the President issued a signing statement evincing both an inability to articulate the principle of law for which the
Airports Case stands and an inability to distinguish between construing a statute
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sional gambit was eventually invalidated by the courts, which
concluded that it violated the separation of powers under the
~
the courts
analysis set forth in the Airports C a ~ e . "Although
did curb this congressional overreaching again-an overreaching apparently motivated by the pettiest kind of self-interest-it will never be possible t o accuse the Bush administration
of having been a significant contributor to that outcome.

D. Summary
The three examples discussed in this section show that the
Bush administration was willing to tolerate and even advocate
substantial losses of presidential legal authority in response to
perfectly ordinary-and in some cases remarkably trivial-political pressures. As the examples suggest, such pressures sometimes operated directly on the president and sometimes they seem to have had their effect at lower levels of the
government. When one looks at these incidents-together with
the results of the administration's strategy of using signing
statements, veto messages, and presidential addresses t o articulate an ambitious agenda for defending the presidency-there
appears t o be no evidence that the President's agenda was
signdicantly furthered or even seriously pursued. Not only did
the Bush administration fail to carry out a "precommitment
strategy" of the kind described by Professor McGinnis, but it
may have undermined its credibility on the Hill by wrapping
itself rhetorically in high-flown constitutional "principles" that
were abandoned as soon as adhering to them became inconvenient.

Perhaps the most remarkable example of the Bush
administration's reluctance to act on its stated principles transpired after the President became a lame duck in the autumn
of 1992. In a well-publicized series of judicial decisions growing
out of an arcane dispute over the litigating authority of the
U.S. Postal Senrice, President Bush and his Justice Depart-

to avoid constitutional issues and declaring a statute unconstitutional. See Statement on Signing the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of
1992, 28 WKLY.COMP.PRES. DOC.2232 (Oct. 30, 1992).
175. Hechinger v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth., 36 F.3d 97 0 . C .
Cir. 1994), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
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ment suffered serious setbacks on several important issues
involving presidential legal authority.176These losses are significant for present purposes not so much because they occurred, but because they could likely have been avoided if the
administration had proceeded in a timely fashion according to
the principles that it claimed t o treasure.
On January 22, 1991, the U.S. Postal Service filed suit
against the Postal Rate Commission in the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. Although such suits are specifically authorized by statute, they are constitutionally questionable because they assume that disputes within the executive
establishment can be resolved by an entity outside the
president's control. The principle at stake-that the executive
department of government is a unitary entity subject to the
president's control and supervision-implies that a suit brought
by one executive agency against another is a kind of absurdity,
like a person bringing suit against himself. It is also a principle
that is central to the constitutional vision to which President
Bush committed himself at the beginning of his administration,
and which he affirmed in numerous signing statements
throughout his term.177
Despite the centrality of the unitary executive in the jurisprudence adopted by the Bush administration, the theory has

176. The discussion below presents a simplified account of an extraordinarily
complex dispute. For a more complete presentation of the legal and factual details,
and a thoughtful analysis of the issues, see Neal Devins, Tempest in a n Envelope:
Reflections on the Bush White House's Failed Takeover of the US. Postal Service,
41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1035 (1994).
177. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1992, 28 WRLY.COMP. PREs. DOC. 2186, 2186-87 (Oct. 28, 1992); Statement
on Signing the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992, 28 WRLY. COW. PRES. DOC. 2134, 2134-35 (Oct. 26, 1992); Statement on
Signing the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 28 WRLY.COMP. PREs. DOC. 2094, 2096
(Oct. 24, 1992); Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service, and General
Government Appropriations Act, 1993, 28 WRLY.COW. PRES. DOC. 1873, 1874
(Oct. 6, 1992); Statement on Signing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991, 27 WKLY.COW. PREs. DOC. 1873 (Dec. 19, 1991); Statement on Signing the Joint Resolution Settling the Railroad Strike, 27 WmY. COMP.
PREs. DOC. 459, 459-60 (April 18, 1991); Statement on Signing the Bill Modifying
the Boundaries of the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge, 26 WKLY.COMP.
PREs. DOC. 1897 (Nov. 21, 1990); Statement on Signing the Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Act, 1991, 26 WRLY.COMP. PREs. DOC. 1771, 1771-72
(Nov. 5, 1990); Statement on Signing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989, 25 WRLY. COMP.PRES. DOC. 1970, 1970-71 (Dec. 19, 1989); Statement on
Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act,
1990, 25 WRLY.COMP. PRES. DOC. 1669, 1669-70 (Nov. 3, 1989).
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met with a chilly reception in the courts, which have taken a
relaxed attitude to the creation of independent agencies that
are legally insulated from presidential control (at least when
those agencies perform functions that do not seem t o be a t the
core of the president's own constitutional re~~onsibilities).'~~
When confronted with the Postal Service lawsuit, the administration therefore had two obvious choices. It could let the suit
go forward, hoping that nobody would notice the retreat from
administration principles. Or it could try to use the President's
claimed authority over the two agencies to force them to resolve their dispute outside the courts.
This should have been an easy decision. The Postal Service
is controlled by an eleven-member Board of Governors that
comprises nine part-time Governors together with the Postmaster General and the Deputy Postmaster General (who are chosen by the Governors). At the time of this dispute, all of the
Governors had been appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush,
and a majority were Republicans. Although the Postmaster
General and his Deputy could have been expected to resist
presidential control because they were full-time officials with a
vested interest in their statutory independence, it should have
been political child's play for a then-popular president to persuade a sufficient number of the part-time Governors t o avoid a
confrontation with him over an obscure legal issue that he
considered important. Had this occurred, a useful administrative precedent would have been created, and without the risk of
any adverse judicial decisions. If the President had failed t o
persuade the Board of Governors to go along with his wishes,
the administration could then have made a considered decision
whether to risk litigation or to retreat t o the passive role embodied in the first option.
The Bush administration took neither of the obvious paths.
Instead it entered a prolonged period of dithering, during
which it relied on what one commentator has aptly called a

178. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Wiener

v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988);
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
There is a large academic literature dealing with various issues raised by the
theory of the unitary executive. Good introductions to the underlying arguments on
which the Bush administration's position must ultimately rest can be found in
Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41; Steven G.
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155 (1992).
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strategy of "delay, threats, and prayers."17gThe public record
does not indicate who was responsible for this "strategy," but
there can be no doubt that it was adopted. In any event, as the
delay continued the threats began t o look empty, and the
prayers went unanswered. Finally, some twenty months later,
further stalling became impossible, and the Justice Department
formally directed the Postal Service to withdraw its lawsuit.
After this extremely tardy directive was predictably ignored,
President Bush at last took action. On December 11, 1992, a
president whose political resources had largely evaporated
when he lost his bid for re-election took the extraordinary step
of personally directing the Board of Governors to withdraw the
lawsuit, on pain of dismissal. The Board voted six to five to
defy the President, and the winning majority immediately went
to court seeking an order t o block their threatened removal.
The President responded by attempting to use his recess appointment power to replace one of the Governors, which might
have led to a reversal of the Board's narrow decision t o ignore
his directive.
The upshot of this litigation was a total victory for the
Postal Service and a complete loss for the President. First,
President Bush was subjected to an unprecedented court order
forbidding him to discharge presidential appointees.'" Second, the court of appeals ruled that the Postal Service had the
authority to bring suit against the Postal Rate Commission
even in defiance of the president.lS1The court firmly rejected
the Justice Department's theory of the unitary executive, concluding that the judiciary may resolve disputes arising among
executive agencies when authorized by statute t o do so.'" Finally, although the Clinton administration continued t o defend
Bush's recess appointment, that issue was also resolved against
the pre~idency.'~

179. Devins, supra note 176.
180. Mackie v. Bush, 809 F. Supp. 144, 148 (D.D.C. 1993), dismissed as moot
sub nom. Mackie v. Clinton, 10 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
181. Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. United States Postal Sew., 986 F.2d 509, 527
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
182. Id. at 527 & n.9. The Justice Department had also attempted to persuade
the court that it had a statutory right to prevent the Postal Service from filing the
lawsuit, but this argument, too, was rejected. Id. at 522.
183. Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56, 58 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated in part as
moot, 1994 WL 163761 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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Thus ended George Bush's experiment with presidential
commitment to the theories developed by the constitutional
lawyers who saw themselves as the guardians of the presidency. The Bush administration arrived where the Reagan administration had so often found itself: begging the courts for relief
from impositions that might have been avoided through the
exercise of political will. One difference, however, is that while
the Reagan administration a t least achieved some notable
victories through litigation, as in Chadha and in Bowsher, the
Bush administration seems to have contributed less than nothing to the few legal gains that the presidency made during its
four years in office.

VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most obvious question raised by the Bush
record on separation of powers is whether the absence of signal
successes in enhancing or defending the office of the presidency
resulted more from incompetence or from the operation of incentives that caused the administration t o put greater value on
achieving other goals. Examples like the postal service case
and the airports litigation suggest that ineptitude played a
significmt role, for in neither case does any strong overriding
political or policy goal seem to explain the administration's
failure t o defend the interests of the presidency. Poor execution
of policy, however, occurs in all administrations (and all other
large organizations), so examples like these are not necessarily
very revealing.
In this case, incompetence is not likely the sole or even
principal explanatory factor even for those incidents in which it
probably played an important part. In the airports matter, for
example, the Justice Department became institutionally invested in defending the congressional board of review during the
Reagan administration. One would therefore have expected this
defense t o have continued during the Bush administration, as
it did, unless the new President's special commitment to policing the separation of powers had been taken quite seriously.
What this incident suggests more strongly than anything else
is that the commitment communicated by the President was
not strong enough t o overcome ordinary forces of bureaucratic
inertia and personal egotism at the Justice Department. Similarly, the Postal Service case is probably best explained in
terms of an unwillingness by the Justice Department t o request
that the President take action in a matter that involved only
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separation of powers principles (with no prospect of collateral
political or policy benefits), during a period when both the
President and the Department's senior officials had more politically promising and seemingly urgent items competing for their
time and attention. Both cases might have seemed quite important t o lawyers whose principal concern was constitutional law
and the long-term effects of that law on the structure of government, but neither case promised the President or the Attorney General any immediate political or policy payoff. The same
kind of explanation seems to fit the Bush record taken as a
whole. Consider each group of incidents analyzed in this paper:
the compromises that followed the four vetoes that were based
on objections to legislative encroachments on the president's
authority; the Administration's support of the unconstitutional
statutory appointment in the FIRREA legislation; and the
virtual absence of a willingness to violate the many unconstitutional provisions (such as legislative vetoes) contained in legislation signed by the President. Taken together, all of these suggest that the defense of the presidency never assumed real
importance in the Bush administration.
The President's public pronouncements, however, as well
as the prominent role that he assigned in his administration to
lawyers known especially for their interest in separation of
powers issues,'" and the extremely s c ~ p u l o u sattention that
was given to these issues in his signing statements and veto
messages, suggest that these issues were deemed quite important by President Bush. Since Bush had little or nothing to
gain from feigning this interest in the defense of his office,
there is no reason t o suppose that his intellectual commitment
to the issue was anything other than genuine. His
administration's strong pattern of signfxant concessions, inaction at crucial moments, and downright self-destructiveness,
therefore suggests that a more resolute pattern of behavior
would have imposed short-term costs that the President and
others around him simply proved unwilling to pay. One should

184. The Counsel to the President, C. Boyden Gray, was generally considered
to be among the most influential members of the White House staff. See, e.g.,
h e Kornhauser, Boyden Gray: Not Just George Bush's Layer, LEGALTIMES,
Nov. 12, 1990, at 1. Bush's first Assistant Attorney General for OLC, William P.
Ban; became known while in that office primarily for his defense of presidential
authority, and was eventually promoted to Attorney General. Barr's successor at
OLC, J. Michael Luttig, was one of only three officials in the Bush Justice Department to receive a coveted appointment to a United States court of appeals.
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expect other presidents and other administrations t o be subject
t o the same incentives, and one should expect them to respond
t o those incentives in a similar manner. What makes the Bush
administration unusual is only that the President and some of
his lawyers seemed to think at the outset that this time things
could be different.
Those who hoped to assist President Bush in strengthening
the office he temporarily held must have been personally disappointed in the outcome. Some of them may even have been
disappointed in the President himself. Should other citizens
share this sense of a missed opportunity? I suspect not, and I
believe the reason has implications that go beyond the particular incidents that so preoccupied the lawyers during the Bush
administration. Whether in the context of the separation of
powers or in that of ethics-and sometimes in both at once, as
with Iran-Contra-the increased lawyerization of political disputes since Watergate has often submerged real disputes about
substantive choices beneath distracting contests over abstract
principles. This has probably had some healthy effects, for
distractions can sometimes avert potentially destructive clashes. And there would be poisonous long-term consequences if
disputes over ethics issues and separation of powers were
fought out as naked trials of political strength. But more of a
good thing is not always better. The logic of reframing political
disputes in legal terms can ultimately draw lawyers into the
role of the client, a result that lawyers seldom find disagreeable. But it would be irresponsible for a President to let his
lawyers determine how far he should push the defense of his
constitutional prerogatives, just as it would be to cede the definition of those prerogatives to Congress. The professional training and professional obligations of lawyers do not qualifgr them
for that task, however valuable and necessary their advice on
the subject may be.
George Bush and his administration may not have made
all the right decisions in trying to balance the president's substantive goals and his constitutional responsibilities t o his
office. That would hardly distinguish his presidency from any
other, and it ought not to obscure the fad that he at least did
not leave his office significantly weaker in legal terms than
when he assumed it. It is obvious that Bush might have weakened the presidency by offering too little resistance to an aggressive Congress. But it is equally true, and much less obvi-
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ous, that he might also have weakened it by letting his lawyers
effectively assume an office to which they were not elected.
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AFTERWORD:
A NOTI3 ON SOURCES
AND METHODS
The analysis presented in this article is based on a study of
the public record, and those who are skeptical about its conclusions can test the evidence presented here against that record.
This point deserves some emphasis because I worked in the
Office of the Counsel to the President during the Bush administration, and in OLC during the Reagan administration. Anyone with such a background might reasonably be supposed t o
have the usual biases that arise when one has been involved
with events and institutions that one later seeks to explain.1g5It should not be thought, however, that lack of direct
involvement in government provides any assurance of impartiality in the study of government. Those who devote their time
to the study of their own country's political institutions are not
likely to be unaffected by their own political opinions, and
those opinions need to be disciplined for the same reason and
in much the same way as the biases of the former participant.
The difficulties in preventing one's political beliefs from
distorting one's analysis are particularly acute in the study of
legal policy and separation of powers, where there is nothing
like a political or academic consensus about the basic criteria
that one could use to judge the performance of government
officials and institutions. For that reason, scholars who work in
this area cannot easily escape the necessity of acquiring a detailed familiarity with the legal issues and materials that legal
policy-makers must grapple with in their own work. Such familiarity is also needed t o avoid a different kind of shortcoming, because adequate analysis also requires independence from
the explanations offered by policy-makers for their own conduct. This afterword provides illustrations of both points, using
examples drawn from two of the most detailed recent studies of
the operation of the legal bureaucracies that have primary
responsibility for separation of powers issues.
Professor Cornell W. Clayton's critique of the Bush
administration's approach to legal policy illustrates some of the
pitfalls that can trap those who do not acquire a sufficient

185. For an example of an uninhibitedly polemical account of the separation of
powers controversies that took place during the Bush administration, one may
consult TIEFER,supra note 109. Mr. Tiefer, a lawyer employed by the House of
Representatives, views the Bush administration virtually as a reprise of the failed
monarchies of Charles I and James 11. All three, according to Mr. Tiefer, were
characterized by the pathologies of "the doctrine of personal rule." Id. at 20.
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familiarity with the law.'" Professor Clayton, who sees the
Bush approach to legal policy as a n ill-advised extension of the
Reagan administration's misguided efforts to increase its control over the administrative state (and thereby to diminish
congressional influence), concludes that a new alliance between
the Justice Department and a conservative Supreme Court has
implications that are "potentially far more dangerous to the
rule of law" than previous presidential efforts to supervise legal
admini~tration.'~~
Although this threat to "the rule of law"
remains obscure in Professor Clayton's analysis, it seems to
proceed from a notion that the "politicization" of legal policy by
recent conservative presidents constitutes a n improper evasion
of congressional will.'" The best solution, Professor Clayton
suggests, may be for Congress to remove the Justice Department from the president's control.'"
Leaving aside the implausible suggestion that the Supreme
Court's separation of powers jurisprudence would permit the
president's authority over the Justice Department's core law
enforcement functions to be taken away,lgOthe legal materials that Professor Clayton uses to support his thesis do not i n
fact support his claims. I will limit myself here to two examples
that are especially relevant to this article because they involve
the Bush administration's approach to separation of powers.
186. CLAYTON,
supra note 29, at 226-36.
187. Id. at 236.
188. By "politicization," Professor Clayton apparently means that Reagan and
Bush tried to ensure that the Justice Department acted on the President's views
about legal policy rather than on the views held by career lawyers and congressional liberals. See, e.g., id. at 204 ("By forgoing a [civil rights] legislative strategy
and engaging in guerrilla warfare against Congress, the [Reagan] Justice Department created friction within the bureaucracy and isolated itself from congressional
support."); id. at 224 ("In a system that vests legislative authority in Congress, any
t
model of strong presidential leadership c a ~ o afford
to set itself up as a competitor with Congress. If it does, the likely outcome will be stricter congressional control of administration and greater judicial oversight of the executive."). Thus, Professor Clayton seems to think that strong leadership consists of preemptive surrender and that the rule of law is fostered by presidents acquiescing in measures that
they regard as illegal.
189. Id. at 236.
190. Professor Clayton seems t o think that the Court's decision in Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), implies that such an action would be permissible, but
he quotes nothing from Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion to support this suggestion. Actually, the Court emphasized that its holding was limited to sustaining the
validity of certain statutory restrictions on the president's right to appoint and
remove "Independent Counsel" who are chosen to conduct specific investigations
into allegations of misconduct by government officials who might otherwise be able
to prevent the enforcement of the law against themselves.
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First, after claiming that the Bush administration went
farther than its predecessors in using "signing statements t o
gut congressional policies with which it di~agreed,"~~'
Professor Clayton offers as his only example a draR signing statement that the President never issued:
In the most egregious example of this practice, Boyden Gray
circulated a statement interpreting the 1991 Civil Rights Act
so as to gut several key provisions, even before the bill was
signed. . . . [The Gray directive] specifically attacked race
preference policies and would have ended the use of preferences and quotas in federal hiring. The directive was clearly
an attempt to achieve administratively what the administration was not able to achieve in its fight with Congress over
the wording of the Civil Rights Act.'"

Not only was the draft signing statement described here never
issued,lg3but Professor Clayton's characterization of it is demonstrably inaccurate. Gray's draft would have required federal agencies to terminate programs "that may be inconsistent
with the new law or with the principle of discouraging quotas
and unfair preferences. So-called 'race norming' of the General
Aptitude Test Battery, for example, is plainly forbidden by
section 106 of the new Act."lL The Gray draft would also

191. CLAYTON,
supra note 29, at 234.
192. Id.
193. Gray's drafk signing statement was circulated within the government
through a standard interagency review process, which it survived. After the draft
was leaked to the press, the President decided not to issue it. KOLB,supru note
79, at 258. In a television interview, the President later indicated that his decision
was based on apprehensions about the effects that misinterpretations of the document would have:
MR. FROST: And is that why you stopped the Boyden Gray directive,
because that would have gone too far?
PRESIDENT BUSH: That had the appearance-it
was an internal
letter that went out to ask for comments from the various departments,
which is all right to do. But it looked like, it looked like that it was
positioning me as opposed to affirmative action. And it wasn't supposed to
do that, and so we tried to correct all that.
The President and Mrs. Bush '...Talking with David Frost,' (Jan. 3, 1992) (LEXIS,
Nexis Library, FedNew File).
The Gray draft is reprinted in David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The
Civil Rights A d of 1991 316-18 (Feb. 13, 1992) (study materials Q204 for Video
Law Review sponsored by the American Law Institute-American Bar Association
Committee on Continuing Professional Education and cosponsored by the Federal
Judicial Center).
194. See supra note 193.
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have directed federal agencies to begin work on new employee
selection guidelines, t o be "established under section 105 and
other provisions of the Act," and it would have directed federal
agencies to cease inducing employers "to violate the laws" by
adopting quotas, preferences, and set-asides "on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."lg5 In addition t o
the fact that the document focused on requiring federal agencies t o conform with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, including
such specific provisions as the statute's flat prohibition of "race
norming," there is not one word in that statute authorizing the
kind of "quotas and unfair preferences" described in the draft.
On the contrary, the statute specifically and expressly forbids
"any employment practice [in which] race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin [is] a motivating factor . . . even though other
factors also motivated the practi~e."'~~
Thus, the statute
plainly and on its face dictates exactly the policy that Professor
Clayton castigates Gray for recommending.
This misinterpretation seems to have arisen from unfamiliarity with the relevant legal materials and background. At one
point, for example, Professor Clayton makes the following
statement about the Bush Justice Department: "In Wards Cove
v. Antonio [sic] (1gag), Patterson v. McClean Credit Union
(1989), and City of Richmond v. Croson (1989), the department
argued and finally won a majority of the Court to accept its
position that the use of disparate impact evidence under Title
[ W ] should be re~tricted."'~'This sentence contains several
195. See supra note 193.
196. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071,
1075. In a carefully worded proviso that is rife with deliberate ambiguities, the
statute also declares that nothing in it should be "construed to affect court-ordered
remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements, that are in accordance with
the law." Id. 8 116, 105 Stat., 1071, 1079. It may be possible to construct an argument, resting in part on section 116, for construing section 107 to mean the opposite of what it says, but that would hardly be a sufficient basis for concluding
that Gray was trying to "gut congressional policies" when he proposed a directive
implementing the exact policy commanded by the plain language of a new law that
Congress had just passed. For completely opposing views on what the "congressional policy" underlying these two provisions was, see 137 CONG.REC. S15472,
S15476, S15477-78 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (memorandum submitted by Sen. Dole
on behalf of himself, thirteen other Senators, and the Bush administration); id. at
H9526, H9529, H9530 (memorandum submitted by Rep. Don Edwards).
In any event, even if one assumes that section 107 means something completely Merent from what it says, there is absolutely nothing in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 or anywhere else in the law requiring the president or the federal
agencies that he supervises to implement or encourage the kind of quota hiring or
other "unfair preferences" described in the Gray draft.
supra note 29, at 231 (endnote omitted). Professor Clayton's
197. CLAYTON,
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errors. First, none of these cases was briefed or argued during
the Bush administration. Second, Patterson had nothing to do
with disparate impact evidence or with Title VII, and the Court
rejected the position advocated by the Justice Department in
that case. Third, the Croson decision had nothing to do with
either of these issues or with any other federal statute. In a
note appended to this sentence, Professor Clayton says that
"Congress overturned these decisions by passing the Civil
Rights Act of 1991."198The 1991 statute in fact codified large
parts of Wards Cove, including its holding, and unambiguously
"overturned" only one relatively minor dictum. The 1991 Act
overturned Patterson, but in doing so it adopted the position
advocated by the Bush administration throughout the legislative debate, which in turn was consistent with the position
taken by the Justice Department in the Patterson litigation
itself. Finally, the 1991 Act contains no provisions that have
anything to do with the legal issue in the Croson case.
A second example of difficulties that can ensue when complex legal issues are treated in too summary a fashion arises in
Professor Clayton's discussion of the relation between the Supreme Court's Chevron doctrine (which requires judicial deference to federal agencies' interpretations of statutes in certain
circumstances) and Justice Scalia's views on the use of legislative history in statutory construction. According t o Professor
Clayton, the Bush Justice Department was engaged in a "quest
t o get the Supreme Court t o place more stringent limitations
on lower court review of administrative action."1ggThe key to
this effort, we are told, was Justice Scalia, who has "championed broad application of the Chevron standards" and who "has
argued that lower courts should ignore congressional intent
altogether as a basis for reviewing administrative action.77200
At best, these are caricatures of Justice Scalia's positions.
Taking the second allegation first, Professor Clayton cites two
of Scalia's opinions (one for the Court and one concurring in
the Court's judgment) to support his description of Scalia's
position on congressional intent.201But neither case involved
book refers to "Title VI" rather than to Title VII, but I presume that this was a
typographical error.
198. Id. at 231, 238 11.28.
199. Id. at 234.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 234-35 (discussing Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S.
597 (1991), and West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S.83 (1991)).
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a review of any federal administrative interpretation, and neither opinion advocates ignoring congressional intent. In neither
case, nor anywhere else that I am aware of, has Scalia even
suggested that lower courts should adopt different principles in
interpreting statutes than the Supreme Court should. Nor do I
believe that Scalia has ever contended that any court should
"ignore congressional intent altogether.''
Professor Clayton's notion that Scalia wants t o "ignore
congressional intent altogether" seems to proceed from a misunderstanding of Scalia's views about the use of legislative
history in statutory construction: "According to [Scalia's] view,
all that is important is the language of [the] statute, not
Congress' efforts to explain what its statutes mean through
committee reports or legislative histories."202So far as I am
aware, however, Scalia has never asserted that courts should
ignore the legislative history of a statute when it provides the
most probative evidence of a statute's meaning, and Professor
Clayton cites no such assertion. Scalia has argued, in considerable detail and in a variety of contexts, that courts should not
unnecessarily substitute inferences drawn from the legislative
history of statutes (which consists of statements by entities
other than Congress, such as congressional committees and
individual members) for inferences drawn from the statute
itself (which is the only thing that Congress has actually voted
on). Some of what Scalia has said about the complex and difficult subject of statutory construction is controversial, and it
deserves debate. One cannot, however, properly evaluate the
validity of Scalia's views, or understand their relation to various doctrines involving the separation of powers, unless one
begins with what he has actually said.
Professor Clayton's depiction of Scalia as a champion of a
"broad application" of the Chevron doctrine is more surprising
than his rendition of Scalia's views on legislative intent. Cheuron was decided, by a unanimous Court, before Scalia even
~ ~ has adhered t o that precedent,
became a J u s t i ~ e . 2Scalia
and he appears to regard it as a sound decision.2MBut he is

202. CLAYTON,
supra note 29, at 234.
203. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
204. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-55 (1987) (Scalia, J.
concurring in the judgment); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511.
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not a champion of an especially "broad application" of the doctrine. On the contrary, Scalia seems exceptionally unlikely to
find that particular statutes are sufficiently ambiguous t o trigger Chevron deferen~e.~"
He has, moreover, forcefully argued
against extending deference t o agency interpretations of statutes (and rejected interpretations by the Reagan and Bush
administrations) in circumstances not directly governed by
Chevron.206The only decision involving Chevron that Profesa ~case
'
sor Clayton discusses, however, is Rust v. S u l l i ~ a n ~
in which Scalia did not write a single word of any of the four
opinions that were filed.
Rust is also an odd case to use as evidence of a "quest to
get the Supreme Court to place more stringent limitations on
lower court review of administrative action."208As Professor
Clayton acknowledges, the Court's decision was "consistent
with the Chevron precedent.''20g Rust generated considerable
controversy, on and off the Court, but the serious questions
that were raised had to do with abortion and the First Amendment, not with Chevron. And even on those questions, Professor Clayton's analysis misses the mark.
Rust arose from an agency's re-interpretation of a statute
that forbids the use of certain federal funds "in programs
where abortion is a method of family planning."210 These

205. See, e.g., Maislin Indus., US., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 US. 116,
136-38 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 486 US. 281,
318-28 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Scalia, supra
note 204.
206. See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 US. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 481
US. 573 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
207. 500 US. 173 (1991).
208. CLAYTON,
supra note 29, at 234. In Rust, the Supreme Court ffirmed the
judgments reached by both of the lower courts in that case.
209. Id. at 235.
210. The fad that the agency had previously interpreted the statute differently, a fad that appears to bother Professor Clayton considerably, was not an important issue in Rust. Chevron itself upheld a regulation that had reversed the
agency's previous position. Chevron USA. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 US. 837, 865 (1984). Subsequent case law has confirmed that agencies are free to revise their interpretations of ambiguous statutes without thereby
triggering increased judicial skepticism:
To be sustained as reasonable, the agency interpretation need not be the
only permissible one, and if reasonable it wiU be upheld even though the
court might have construed the statute differently. The agency may
change its view, provided the new interpretation is consistent with the
statute and reasonable, and the change was based on reasoned decision-
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funds were directed at caring for women who were not pregnant; if a pregnancy occurred the woman was referred to other
programs that were not governed by the statutory restriction a t
issue. Based on its interpretation of this statute, the agency
issued regulations forbidding federally funded family-planning
clinics from promoting abortion. Among the forbidden activities
were counselling women who became pregnant to procure an
abortion, and referring them t o other clinics that specialize in
performing abortions. The regulations allowed patients to be
given lists of pre-natal care providers, which might include
providers who performed abortions, but patients were not supposed to be "steered" toward those that offered abortion as a
method of family planning.
A narrowly divided Supreme Court upheld the validity of
these regulations, concluding that the regulations were based
on a permissible interpretation of the statute; that the regulations did not infringe the First Amendment rights of those who
were forbidden to use federal funds to promote or procure abortions; and that the Court's abortion jurisprudence did not compel the government t o subsidize abortion-related activities.
Colorable arguments could be made against the Court's decision, as they were by some of the dissenting Justices. Those
arguments, however, cannot be properly evaluated unless one
separates the legal issues from whatever strong feelings one
may have about the propriety of using public funds to promote
abortion.
Professor Clayton's analysis, unfortunately, does not begin
with the requisite separation of legal from political issues.
First, his off-handed description of the regulations as a "gag
d e n 2 1 1 obscures the legal issue. Many laws and regulations
restrict the ability of federal grantees t o use the money they
receive for certain kinds of advocacy. Few of these are ever

making, adequately explained. Thus, there need be no single true and
enduring interpretation. Where Congress has not dewtively spoken,
agency interpretation is largely a matter of discretionary policy-making,
the "wisdom"of which is of no concern to a reviewing court.
Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J . ON REG. 1, 27-28 (1990) (footnotes omitted); see also Michael
Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12
CARDOZO
L. REV. 1671 (1991) ("[IN is generally understood that Chevron has removed the stigma from agency flip-flops [in cases where the statute is ambiguous].").
supra note 29, at 236.
211. CLAYTON,
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challenged, and they are rarely condemned with epithets like
"gag rule." This is political rhetoric that even the most passionate of the dissenting Justices in Rust did not employ. Second, it
is highly misleading to say that the Court "allowed the administration t o attach an otherwise unconstitutional condition to
the receipt of public funds."212This use of the word "otherwise," without further discussion, clouds one of the more legally
important issues in the case. All the Justices, like everyone
else who is familiar with the relevant precedents, agreed that
the government may sometimes attach "an otherwise unconstitutional condition to the receipt of public funds."213The difficult questions, on which the Court was divided in this case,
have to do with when such conditions are permissible and
Third, there is not one statewhen they are impermi~sible.~"
ment in the Rust Court's opinion t o support Professor Clayton's
claim that the Court was willing "to abandon what it thinks
Congress intended."215Finally, it is difficult even to imagine
what is meant when Professor Clayton says, after noting that
President Bush vetoed a bill that would have overruled Rust,
that the Court's willingness to "stand idly by while the President uses his veto to prevent corrective legislation must be
viewed with alarm."216 For over two centuries, the courts
have been standing "idly by" when presidents have used the
veto. This is because the Constitution contains no provisions
authorizing the courts to overrule presidential vetoes, any more
than it contains provisions authorizing the courts to overrule
congressional failures t o enact legislation. One can safely predict that the sudden assumption of such authority by the courts
would be viewed with considerably more alarm by informed
observers than anything that happened in connection with the
Rust decision.

2 12. Id.
213. Justice Blackmuds dissent, for example, correctly noted that the case
raised an issue about "the extent to which the Government may attach an otherwise unconstitutional condition to the receipt of a public benefit," and observed
that this issue "implicates a troubled area of our jurisprudence." Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 209 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
214. The majority, for example, acknowledged that its analysis was not meant
"to suggest that funding by the Government, even when coupled with the freedom
of the fund recipients to speak outside the scope of the Government-funded project,
is invariably sufficient to justify government control of the content of expression."
Id. at 205 (majority opinion).
215. CLAYTON,
supra note 29, at 236.
216. Id.
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Professor Clayton's critique of the Bush administration
thus illustrates some of the difficulties that can arise because
of the relative inaccessibility of legal materials to researchers
trained in other fields. It may be possible to defend some parts
of his thesis, but doing so would require finding evidence far
more powerful than anything he has provided.
Professor James Michael Strine's analysis of OLC illustrates a different kind of constraint on students of legal bureaucracies. Professor Strine's ambitious study seeks to avoid
the oversimplifications of prior scholarship by using social role
theory to show how "[v]alues of professionalism and political
responsibility provided relatively enduring institutional constraints in the growth of the Justice Department."217 By focusing on what he calls "psychological role strain," Professor
Strine tries to show that the behavior of OLC can best be explained as the product of ongoing efforts by individual lawyers
to resolve a n inherent tension between professional norms that
seem to call for "an idealized, neutral administration of law"
with the demands of other governmental actors (most notably
the White House Counsel's office) for allegiance to the
president's agendae218
Professor Strine's approach offers a valuable supplement to
previous efforts because of its focus on the interplay between
the choices made by government lawyers and the constraints of
the environment in which they operate. His study of this interplay also recognizes the difficulties imposed by the confidential
nature of OLC's work. In an effort to overcome these difficulties, Professor Strine undertook detailed case studies of several
major legal controversies in which OLC was involved, relying
heavily on documentary evidence available from sources such
as congressional hearings and presidential archives, as well as
on interviews with people who had been involved with OLC.
The discipline imposed by this method had worthwhile results,
and many of Professor Strine's conclusions are unexceptionable.
In certain respects, however, I believe the analysis was carried
astray because his methodology was not able to compensate
adequately for the constraints imposed by the sources.
One example can be found in the sympathy that Professor
Strine displays for the OLC lawyers who he believes must
make difficult choices between their professional obligations
217. Strine, supra note 18, at 30.
218. See id. at 30-33.

171

THE DEFENSE OF THE PRESIDENCY

97

and the political demands placed on them by others in the
government. At one point he says:
For lawyers in the OLC, independence differentiated them
from the presidential sycophants in the White House Counsel.
Searching for a role in the wake of organizational turmoil,
lawyers at the OLC abandoned the practice of balancing political and professional values in favor [of] an ethic of independent, principled interpretation of the law. The OLC lawyers
believed in their independent conception of the Constitution
and the professionalist ideology of the legal process. The result of these changes was an OLC willing to adjudicate interagency disputes and pursue direct legal confrontations with
Congress.219

It is no doubt true that some OLC lawyers have regarded those
who worked in the White House Counsel's office as "presidential sycophants," and believed that their own motivations were
fmer and purer. Uncritical acceptance of this view of OLC lawyers, however, obscures the possibility that OLC lawyers have
sometimes used this image of themselves to justify actions
taken at least in part for other reasons.
Professor Strine's view of OLC "professionalism" also fails
to distinguish between the incentives operating on OLC staff
lawyers (who have strong incentives to adopt an "ethic of independent, principled interpretation of the law") and the incentives operating on OLC's Assistant Attorney General (who ordinarily has even stronger incentives to play ball with the "presidential sycophants" in the White H~use).''~One consequence
of Professor Strine's acceptance of the flattering self-image that
OLC lawyers like t o project is that he has great difficulty in explaining why the supposedly institutionalized conflict between
OLC and the White House Counsel's office-whose development through several decades of administrative history he
chronicles in great detail-seems t o have suddenly and inexplicably evaporated with the advent of the Bush administration.'" As I have tried to show in this article, simple self-

219. Id. at 312-13.
220. For a detailed analysis of the incentive structures that shape OLC's behavior, see Lund, supra note 52.
221. Thus, for example, Professor Strine states that "[clhanges in lawyers at
the White House and the Justice Department did not stop the rising rivalry between the two counsellors." Strine, supra note 18, at 314. Elsewhere, however, he
acknowledges that "[tlhe unity of opinion between Bush's White House Counsel and
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interest provides a better explanation for the behavior of those
who provide legal advice t o the president than psychological
role strain. The economic model of human behavior has an
important advantage over Professor Strine's theory of psychological role strain. While Professor Strine's model may throw
some light on the behavior of some individuals at certain times,
it is does not supply a general explanation of the mechanisms
by which the social environment influences individual choice,
and it is not well suited for making testable predictions.
I hope that this article has illustrated how the use of economic analysis and detailed case studies of legal policy-making
can avoid some of the problems encountered by Professors
Clayton and Strine. My own analysis, of course, should be tested against all of the available evidence, and it should be rejected in favor of any better approach that can be devised.

the Justice Department extended to all separation of powers issues." Id. at 298.
Professor Strine offers no examples from the Bush administration suggesting that
the two offices operated on the basis of Merent conceptions of the proper hnction
of a presidential legal advisor.

